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DISINFORMATION, THE MEDIA, AND FOREIGN POLICY

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Foreword

Because the Soviet Union recognizes that the media play a dominant role in shaping people's opinions and perceptions of the US and its policies, it has supplied foreign media with a steady stream of information and propaganda. It also has engaged in active measures, particularly disinformation, to influence foreign media. In the past year, for example, it has conducted campaigns to convince world opinion that the US created the AIDS virus as a weapon; is responsible for the assassinations of such world leaders as Olaf Palme; and has sought to destabilize Third World governments.

Foreign journalists and government officials, when informed of the techniques and objectives of Soviet disinformation, frequently ask: "Doesn't the US do it too?" As an example they usually cite the so-called Libya disinformation campaign, which refers to a memorandum written by former National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter. The Poindexter memorandum mentioned the idea of a US disinformation campaign against Libya.

Such a campaign was never undertaken, however the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a careful investigation and found evidence that a US disinformation campaign was never initiated against Libya. Reporters also investigated and found no evidence.

That the US has no bureaucratic apparatus such as the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union--the entity in charge of Soviet active measures. There is no evidence of US disinformation campaigns against the USSR.

What can be done to expose and refute the Soviet campaigns? One basic step is to explain how the Soviets undertake disinformation and other active measures. This is particularly important now, in the era of glasnost--when Soviet awareness and use of public relations are at alltime highs.

The conference at Airlie House, Airlie, Virginia, was designed to help us, in the US Government, better understand the reasoning behind and technizues for Soviet disinformation activities. Through this better understanding, we can be more responsive. Our goal is to help assure that people's impressions, opinions, and decisions are based on factual information, not disinformation.

The one-day conference was limited in size to facilitate discussion. Eleven journalists and one government official served as panelists. The audience consisted of two academics, six non-panelist journalists, and 12 government officials representing six agencies. The views of the participants do not necessarily reflect US Government positions.

Kathleen C. Bailey,
Conference Chairman

Executive Summary

A brief summary of the key points made by the panelists and audience follows. The participants spoke of their own opinions and experiences, and no attempt has been made to verify any of their statements. Although this document is not intended for broad distribution, several journalists requested that their names not be used. The edited transcript is based on a recording of the conference proceedings.

Reporting From Moscow

o Disinformation is much more acceptable to the Russian culture than to the US. The Russian public, in general, expects the ruling authorities often either not to inform or to disinform. Leninism, with its emphasis on accomplishing goals regardless of the means, exacerbates this cultural trait.

o Correspondents based in Moscow face a variety of rewards and punishments. Those who are not offensive to the authorities are granted interviews, travel, and overall better treatment. Others not only are denied these benefits, but also may be intimidated with close coverage by the Committee on State Security (KGB), threats of expulsion, etc.

o All correspondents feel watched to some degree, and overt invasions of privacy invariably occur. The KGB usually attempts to exploit the weaknesses of journalists by offering women, blackmarket activities, liquor, etc. The techniques of intimidation have not been affected by glasnost.

o Accessibility to Soviet spokesmen is increasing. In fact, Western journalists now face an overload of access to officials, limiting their time and energy for "investigative reporting" and in-depth coverage. Much of the official information is conveyed through press conferences, to which the Soviets increasingly have adapted.

o Some journalists do not cite Soviet officials or spokesmen as their sources of information. This is misleading to Westerners who assume that the same degree of cross-checking and verification that goes into reporting of news in the US applies to Western reporting from Moscow. The USSR is aware of this and exploits it readily. Stories supplied by Victor Louis (a Soviet journalist universally thought to be a KGB officer) are an example.

o Gorbachev's reforms are reminiscent of Khrushchev's. Both tried to bring about radical changes in the Soviet system. It is quite possible that Gorbachev will fail, as did Khrushchev.

Reporting From the Third World

o Western journalists posted in the Third World are a key target for recruitment by the Soviets. Presumably, the objective is to cultivate agents of influence--individuals who will report sympathetically on Soviet goals and policies and negatively on those of the US. The USSR sometimes has had major success in such recruitments. Wilfred Burchett, an Australian journalist, consistently acted as a Soviet agent of influence, while he maintained a facade of independence.

o Eastern bloc countries are particularly active in the Third World. In Nigeria, for example, the Bulgarian program of disinformation and active measures is stronger than that of the USSR.

o The appearance of a disinformation story in the Western media guarantees a certain amount of credibility in Third World media. The sheer number of times that a story is repeated in large part determines its credibility.

o Many Third World countries resent the power and wealth of the US. Nationalism also contributes to anti-American feelings: To show independence, countries often malign the US (an activity that seldom costs them politically). In such a climate, disinformation thrives.

o Latin America has had little experience with the USSR but many negative experiences with the US. This prepares Latins to believe whatever is bad about the US and whatever is good about the USSR.

o Most Third World journalists have not been trained to Western standards, and many have had free trips and/or training in the Soviet bloc. This makes them not only more empathetic toward the USSR but also more susceptible to Soviet pressures. There is substantial evidence that Third World correspondents--most of whom are poorly paid--frequently are bribed to place Soviet-generated articles.

o The Soviets have succeeded in taking over or establishing publications in several countries. Ethnos in Greece and the Patriot in India are examples.

Reporting from the Industrialized Countries

o The European press differs from the US press in that various parties and factions in Europe frequently have their own publications. Readers there expect that the news will be partisan, and it is easier to place pro-Soviet propaganda and, occasionally, disinformation.

o A common Soviet tactic in the West is to identify with local issues, enabling the Soviets to influence--perhaps even to take over--a group or movement. For example, the environmental movement in many countries has been heavily influenced by Soviet efforts to identify environmental concerns with simplified statements of Soviet policy goals on disarmament and defense.

o The Soviets score significantly through use of articulate, English-speaking spokesmen. They have access to US media, particularly television. Correspondents, fascinated with the novelty of the Soviets' accessibility, eagerly give them exposure.

o Journalists are useful to the Soviets for activities other than disinformation. For example, the KGB might acquire through clandestine means a legitimate document whose release would cause substantial embarassment to the US and/or its allies. By providing the document to a journalist, the Soviets can assure dissemination.

Disinformation on Disarmament

o In an effort to get support for their defense-related policies, such as opposition to intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment, the Soviets devote considerable resources to influencing church and peace groups. The USSR has successfully portrayed its policies as "peaceful." Additionally, the USSR has used its own religious groups--Russian Orthodox and Muslims--to hold "international" meetings that publicly endorse Soviet policies.

o The US has a twofold difficulty: It seldom endeavors to explain its defense policies, and when it has tried to do so, it has not used easily understood language. This creates an optimum environment for disinformation, i.e., one in which people have insufficient information on a complex topic.

Recommendations

1. Editors must insist on sending properly trained correspondents to Moscow. Preferably, the correspondents should be experienced, have studied Russian, and be tough minded enough to resist pressure.

2. US Government officials should take more time to talk to correspondents in settings other than news conferences. Both parties could gain understanding from such meetings.

3. Reciprocity must be stressed not only by the US Government but also by editors and publishers. Only when the Soviets

understand that their journalists will be treated just as Western journalists are treated in Moscow will they be evenhanded.

4. The US should make a greater effort to provide training and training materials to Third World journalists. US officials should attempt to communicate on a wider range of issues and not treat the Third World as backward and uninterested.

5. Journalists should take greater care in labeling their sources. Editors should insist on this point.

6. The US Government should provide more unclassified data on how active measures and disinformation work. It also should make a greater effort to explain its policies to the domestic audience in clear, simplified terms.

Definitions

The term active measures is of Soviet origin. In fact, it is specialized KGB terminology for covert operations designed to influence governments, individuals, and/or the public. Within the KGB, the term active measures refers to KGB activity. As a defector said in a recent debriefing, he would not use the term to describe, for example, what the Foreign Ministry does.

The West tends to use active measures more generally to describe political influence activities. Many are covert; some may be overt. Active measures include: funding of political groups, manipulation of local communist parties, use of front groups and agents of influence, and disinformation. The West distinguishes these activities from propaganda, but obviously there is interplay.

Propaganda is value-laden information. It reflects a person's or a government's perspective and interpretation. Disinformation, on the other hand, is nonfactual. It is a lie introduced for the purpose of influencing people's perceptions and opinions. Disinformation--the focus of this conference--is one type of active measure.

It is important to note that the KGB is involved only in certain kinds of active measures. Use of front groups, for example, is directed by the International Department and not by the KGB. The International Department is run by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); its actions therefore are sanctioned by the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

The USSR is not the only source of active measures and disinformation. Other communist and pro-Soviet countries are also involved. In Europe, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary are particularly active. Third World clients of the Soviets are influential as well: Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya and Ethiopia.

Conference on Disinformation,
the Media, and Foreign Policy

Panel 1: Reporting From Moscow

Dr. Bailey: Welcome. We begin this conference with a panel discussion on what it is like to report from Moscow. Some of the questions we might address are: Do the Soviets attempt to influence Western reporting from the USSR? Is monopoly control of access to persons, information, and locations in the USSR an active measure? Is the threat of expulsion or arrest very influential?

We have three distinguished correspondents who have had experience serving in Moscow. First, we will hear from Richard Beeston. Mr. Beeston has been The Washington Times State Department correspondent since 1986. He joined the Daily Telegraph in 1961, serving as its East Africa correspondent from 1963 through 1965; its Middle East correspondent from 1965 through 1969; then here in Washington from 1969 through 1977. From 1977 to 1980, Mr. Beeston reported from Moscow, before returning to Washington as the Telegraph's bureau chief.

Following Mr. Beeston will be Mr. Murray Seeger. Mr. Seeger joined Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in 1987 as director for Corporate Affairs. Previously, he served as the Washington economics correspondent for both Newsweek and the Los Angeles Times before being posted to Moscow in 1972 as the Time's bureau chief. He also served in Bonn and Brussels. From 1982 to 1987, Mr. Seeger was director of information for the AFL-CIO.

Mr. Jim Wallace, our third speaker, began with The Wall Street Journal in 1953. He moved to US News & World Report in 1963, where he has been the Senior Editor for international news since 1983. Mr. Wallace opened bureaus for the US News & World Report in the Soviet Union and China; he has also covered South America, South and Southeast Asia and Japan and East Asia. He received a special award from the Overseas Press Club for his coverage of the USSR.

Each journalist will speak for 10 minutes. Questions and discussion will follow the three presentations. Let us begin with Mr. Beeston.

Mr. Beeston: To fully understand Soviet disinformation, one has to probe Russian character. Disinformation did not begin with Lenin; it is part of the whole psychology of the Russians and their history. However, it has been taken a step further by the communist authorities.

The whole background of a Russian is so different from that of a Western person. A Russian does not have the same concept of truth as a person in the West: The truth is a collective matter, not a personal, individual thing. There is a right answer for any question--produced by the government. People must discover, particularly if they want to survive, what this right answer is. There is no room for a Russian to take an independent judgment on matters. A lie is acceptable in the Russian psychology and, therefore, Russia is the ideal environment for disinformation.

Disinformation is not just something that is put out to the West. Russians disinform each other regularly, so they must read between the lines. One never picks up a newspaper in the Soviet Union and accepts what is printed as fact. One must ask: Why has this been published? What is the objective? Where does the truth lie?

Another major source of disinformation is Intourist, a very large and trumpeted industry, which shows a visitor a completely different world from reality. For example, in a beautiful Russian church, the Intourist guide will declare there is freedom of religion in the USSR. He will point to a market and say, "We have private enterprise here just like the West." Few know how to question that, so many visitors return home thinking the USSR is not too different from the West. The Western press is manipulated in much the same way as tourists; correspondents are shown the best that the Soviet Union has to offer.

Once, for example, on a visit to Murmansk, we journalists were offered an evening with a typical Russian family. The family turned out to be the wife of a fisherman who happened to be away at that time. Other people--the local member of the party and various others--joined us in the apartment, which was located in the most modern block of flats in Murmansk. It soon became clear this flat was not really the woman's. She had only arrived there a few minutes before the Western journalists. She didn't know where the glasses or china were and she was deeply embarrassed, but tried to play the role as best she could.

Disinformation of this sort--misrepresenting the truth about the USSR to trick journalists--is part of the great inferiority complex the Russians have when they are dealing with the West. Much of it results from a desperate feeling that the West is going to laugh at them, that they are not up to Western standards, that they are basically a lazy race trying to persuade people that they are better than they are. This kind of disinformation merely sets the stage for disinformation, not about the Soviet society, but about Soviet behavior.

Bailey: Thank you very much. Mr. Seeger.

Mr. Seeger: Among the many books by American journalists who have worked in Moscow, I have one from 1890 that describes a reporter's attempt to ride a horse across czarist Russia. Buying the horse was easy. An American "Wild West" show had been appearing in Moscow and was willing to sell one of its animals. The intrepid correspondent set out toward the Crimea. Before he completed his trip, his camera had been confiscated by one policeman, his translator arrested and sent back to Moscow by another. The reporter himself had been questioned several times about his intended mission, and he had found it difficult nearly every day to find sleeping accommodations for himself and feed and water for his horse.

I read this book when I was living in Moscow in the early 1970s. I had been regularly harassed by policemen of various descriptions. I had been denied travel requests because no accommodations were available. I had been arrested for taking pictures on the street of a provincial city. The only possible conclusion was that the book issued by the KGB on how to make life and work difficult for American journalists was probably one of those several relics the Bolsheviks appropriated when they took over the czarist police files.

With the addition of new technology, the book is still usable. We all have this habit of looking at the Soviet Union and concluding nothing changes. Of course things change and, over time, they have changed for the better for the journalists assigned to work there. Certainly my predecessors worked under much more difficult conditions than I.

One of my elder friends had lived and worked in the three rooms that I had for an office alone. Like the others of his generation, he trudged down nightly to the central telegraph office to read Pravda, write his copy, submit his copy in duplicate to the censors, and wait to get back the remains so he could tell what had actually been transmitted to his editors.

But my working conditions were more onerous than those faced by my successors, who have multientry visas so they can leave and reenter the country at will. They can travel within the country under much easier conditions, and can send copy from their computer terminals directly to their home offices.

Still, there is so much that is the same in the imposition of active measures against journalists. We learned the term "positive control" to describe the techniques that the internal security bureaucracy applied toward all foreigners, either resident or transient in the Soviet Union. Clearly, journalists were given treatment that differed from that meted out to diplomats, official visitors, and the business representatives working in the Moscow territory. All, of

course, came under the purview of the Committee on State Security--the KGB--as it fulfilled its mandate "to protect the revolution."

The KGB stands squarely between the Soviet people and all foreign influences. In some agencies, we found the KGB operatives working in the International Department. In other places their slot was called the First Department. In any case, every journalist working in Moscow must function under the supposition that every activity he or she engages in, both professional and personal, is of interest to the Soviet security agents. Every new journalist has to learn this lesson. Old, long-term veterans like myself can tell the newcomers our war stories, but it seems everyone new on the beat has to learn for himself.

The surveillance system includes the Intourist travel agency; the ubiquitous UPDK, the agency that supplies basic services to foreigners; Novosti, the news agency that peddles tips and misinformation; all in addition to the guys in the shiny suit or leather jackets and cheap raincoats who are so omnipresent. I also felt that the men and women assigned to shadow us were the dropouts from the KGB academy or apprentices trying to get into it.

The active measures I am familiar with come in two categories: harassment directly applied to journalists and their families in order to make it difficult for them to work; and manipulation applied in order to get journalists to write what the Kremlin wants. The latter was done not only to control what appeared in Western media, but also what was in foreign radio broadcasts.

I worked in Moscow when the Nixon-Kissinger-Brandt theory of detente was in full flower. The first American business representatives were stumbling over one another in their search for big deals. At the 1972 summit conference, the US exchanged vague promises of great economic benefits for vague Soviet promises of a new era of peaceful coexistence. Mutual respect and mutual advantage were the codewords.

When the American press corps found we were getting few of the "mutual" benefits, some of us were delegated to meet with the Foreign Ministry press office to ask why the conditions under which we worked were not being relaxed. The chief of the press office gave us a lecture in which he admitted the inadequacies of the information function in Soviet society and the clear lack of travel capacity at the level foreigners expect.

But most importantly, in saying nyet to our modest requests, he uttered a phrase that is etched in my memory:

"There is no peaceful coexistence for ideology. You are the agents of the enemy ideology."

This was the clearest definition I had ever heard or seen of the official Kremlin view of foreign journalists. It is much more accurate than the rule of thumb that all correspondents are seen as spies or potential spies. The methods used to intimidate correspondents have changed very little over the years. I think I can offer a case history of a series of steps taken against me in an orchestrated fashion.

First, soon after I arrived and wrote negatively about food supplies, I was called by an American colleague. He had been meeting with a Novosti man who had asked about me and who had commented that it seemed my stories were bordering on the anti-Soviet. Some weeks later at a diplomatic reception, similar comments were made directly to me by a member of the Foreign Ministry press office. I then had my first trip request denied and was denounced in a major publication as a "miserable scribbler."

I was denied a request to travel to Georgia and Armenia and was told, "The people of Georgia will not receive you. They do not like what you write." Verbatim, the same thing was said about the people of Armenia. I asked for names and addresses because I said these people were not paying for their subscriptions! At any rate, I continued to be attacked and chastised. I always wrote to the publications that denounced me, offering to meet the author of the attack.

Soviet displeasure with my articles resulted in another interview with a man named Prudkov, who was considered a KGB officer. He was in charge of the international office of the Literaturnaya Gazeta and was the last Soviet to interview a reporter of The Times of London just before the latter was expelled. So this was my interrogator. He gave me a blistering lecture saying that ruling circles did not like what I wrote. He accused me of propagating the idea that the Soviet Union was an underdeveloped country.

Most of us were convinced that detente was so important that the security forces would not expel an American writer for his professional activities. As a result, there were many important, unique stories written in that period; the dissident movement and the Jewish emigre movement were reaching new heights. Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov went public for the first time, as did Soviet author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, but no American correspondents were expelled.

The assortment of harassment included the usual telephone solicitations from English-speaking women when I was alone, breaks in Telex transmission at crucial times, telephone

invitations to meet individuals who had something "very interesting" to tell me, offers on papers handed on the street, and conspicuous following.

The KGB goal clearly was to give reporters the feeling that every move they made at home and on the street was being watched, even though we all knew that was physically impossible. The wise journalists acted under the theory that they were constantly monitored. Some reporters did cower under this kind of pressure, and others simply avoided confrontation at any cost.

The Soviet monitors differentiated among reporters with a reward and punishment system. A clear example of this was in 1973, just before Brezhnev took his trip to the US. I was not invited to meet with him. Yet some reporters had been advised three days in advance to stay in Moscow--a clear signal something important was in the wind.

The standard means of getting journalists to avoid writing on certain subjects was for the KGB to give instructions to the correspondents' translators. Our translators met each Thursday after work with their KGB control officers to get instructions and to make reports on their observations. This was just one of the many means of control.

Bailey: Thank you, Mr. Seeger. Mr. Wallace.

Mr. Wallace: While in the USSR, I tried for more than two and one-half years to take a trip to Murmansk. I had a particular interest in going there, but the Soviets always told me I could not go because there was no hotel there. I continued to press for a trip to Murmansk, citing the fact that two of my cousins were killed there during World War II, and one of them was still buried there. Finally I was able to play on Soviet sentiment. When we got to Murmansk, there was a big hotel, which had obviously been there for 40 years, judging from the plumbing. But it hadn't existed a week before!

Soviet active measures against correspondents are both positive and negative, and in both of these categories there are practical and psychological measures. It is the negative and the practical that are far more important in terms of disinformation in influencing what comes out of Moscow.

An example of a positive practical measure is the effort to compromise every American correspondent who works in Moscow through the use of sex, drink, money, or whatever might exploit an individual's weaknesses. A negative practical measure, for example, is restricting access to news sources and the ability to travel.

A positive psychological measure is the hint that a high-level exclusive interview or travel to a restricted region can be arranged. This measure is ordinarily reserved for correspondents who "genuinely understand the Soviet Union" or who "have the best interests of US-Soviet relations at heart." A negative psychological measure would be creating an atmosphere of suspicion and isolation around journalists. This involves making sure correspondents feel watched and emphasizing that they will be considered responsible for everything their newspaper, magazine, or broadcast contains about the Soviet Union, regardless of whether the correspondent had anything to do with it or not.

During my second week in Moscow, while we were still in a hotel, my wife had to leave the country suddenly. Five minutes after I got back from taking her to the airport, the phone rang. A Soviet girl said she was a friend of my Russian-language teacher in Washington, who had sent her a note to be sure to look me up. She then invited me to a birthday party that night.

Also early in my stay, a Novosti editor suggested that he could arrange an interview for me with the Foreign Minister. But this was accompanied by an offer of some Novosti material to clarify some pieces I was doing on detente. I didn't use their material. I left Moscow three years later never having seen the Foreign Minister except at a distance at receptions.

The Soviets made sure I felt watched. Sometimes my wife and I would come home to the apartment at night to find cigar butts in the ashtray. Neither of us smoke.

Control of access to sources and places is the active measure that hits most journalists most of the time. You would expect access to be closed off to military intelligence areas, but you don't expect access to be closed off to doing a story about the Moscow fire department. For two years, I tried to do a story on this and never was allowed.

It is interesting to note that the Soviets react much more negatively to stories about their society than about their ideology. For example, French and West German correspondents often would write scathing political analyses of the Soviet Union and of the Communist Party. This did not bother the Soviets nearly as much as when American and British correspondents would write stories about food lines and dirty hallways. This is a Russian reaction, not a Soviet one.

The US is the yardstick, and they know they come up very, very badly. So when we write about the broken bricks, this infuriates them. Whereas, political analyses--well, never mind.

To counter the Soviet measure of controlling correspondents, information, and interpretation, two solutions are possible. First, news organizations must send the best correspondents to Moscow.

Soviet studies and language training are not a cost for a news organization, they are an investment which will pay off time after time in your understanding of what and why.

Once, on a trip to Siberia, we correspondents were talking with the local authorities about local prices. We were hundreds, almost thousands, of miles away from main transportation routes, yet they were telling us that because of socialism and state planning, the prices were the same in Siberia as in Moscow or Leningrad.

The interpreter said milk was so many kopecks a liter, quoting the local official to whom we were talking. What the local official actually had said was, "The price of milk is the same as in Moscow, [so many] kopecks a liter, and we often have it!"

I do not know whether the interpreter simply missed that last phrase, which could have been the case as it was rapid conversation, or whether it was done deliberately. Either way, it is an example of why any Moscow correspondent should know the language.

The second action we can take is simply to do more conferences and sessions where we communicate with one another. Despite the arguments we have from time to time, journalists and diplomats, academics, or any other specialists are not natural-born enemies. Good correspondents and good government officials do respect one another. The more we can discuss, the better our ability is going to be to spot and resist Soviet disinformation and other active measures.

Bailey: Thank you, Mr. Wallace. When we were trying to put together this conference, there were several journalists who not only declined to be on panels, but refused to participate at all because they had been to the Soviet Union and wanted to go back, or because they wanted to go to the Soviet Union in the future. They felt that if they were in any way associated with a conference to discuss Soviet disinformation or disinformation as a concept, they wouldn't be allowed to return. Could you comment on that?

Mr. Wallace: The Soviets will know about this conference, and they will know who was here, who spoke, and who said what. I don't think it matters all that much. I think that you cannot live by their rules.

When we first went to Moscow, we were at the apartment of a colleague who shall go nameless. We were talking about something, and suddenly he began to try to silence us and signal that the place was bugged. I do not have any secrets, other than whom we are going to interview. One of the things that my wife and I decided was that we were going to live a normal life. We were going to talk about what we wanted to talk about. We were not going to descend into paranoia which is what the Soviets want you to do. So they might retaliate, yes. But I just say you cannot live by their rules. You have got to live by our rules.

Bailey: Do you think that a journalist participating on a panel such as this would not be allowed back into Moscow?

Mr. Seeger: I don't think it would be particularly relevant. I very much wanted to go back a second time. I had been denounced at least eight times while I was there the first time, so I did not know if they would give me a visa, but they did. Now, they gave me no interviews when I went back a second time, but I had plenty to write about and I went to a lot of cocktail parties.

One of the reasons that journalists are treated fairly well is that the US Government reciprocates for poor treatment of journalists. One thing we have not talked about here is that the journalists from the small countries are the ones who are most victimized by Soviet measures. This is because they are rarely supported by their governments.

A Norwegian serving in Moscow was eager to go to Murmansk near the Norwegian border. The Soviets would never let him go up there, and he was sure it was because the Norwegian Government never put any travel restrictions on Soviet journalists in Norway.

The one anecdote that illustrated this to me was about the sole Swiss journalist in Moscow. The Soviets got tough with him: They threatened to expel him and called in someone from the Swiss Embassy to say so. The Swiss gentleman came back the next day and said that if the Soviets expelled the journalist, the authorization for six Soviet journalists in Switzerland would have to be reexamined.

The Soviets replied that the Swiss were talking about all Soviet journalists in Switzerland. The Swiss retorted that the Swiss journalist in question was the only one in Moscow. They did not touch him.

Mr. Kempe: I was very much involved in negotiations to open a bureau in Moscow for my newspaper. I experienced some of the random Soviet pressures. The Soviets do this to keep journalists off balance. For example, during the negotiations,

the person we were going to hire as our Moscow bureau chief was getting calls from all sorts of people offering him documents. Also, the Soviets used the negotiations to discuss my newspaper's editorial page. They asked whether we could change our policy perspective for two or three months, saying it would help our prospects of getting a bureau. Meanwhile, I was working on some stories in Moscow with a lot of assistance from Soviet authorities in getting interviews. I traveled wherever I wanted. The Soviets continually reminded me, however, that how I wrote my stories would have a bearing on whether my newspaper obtained a bureau.

This type of Soviet pressure does have an effect on many correspondents. They are so afraid of losing access, of losing their bureau, and ruining their career that they do play some of the games and go along with the Soviets. While it is true that your recommendation to send the best journalists to Moscow might help in reducing the impact of Soviet pressures, there is a major obstacle to this approach. The Soviets can delay an accreditation for a correspondent or even refuse to let the best in.

And rather than fighting for that person, the organization usually decides to back off and send someone else. So my question is: Do you think that editors should take greater responsibility for what the reporters are doing?

Mr. Seeger: Editors and publishers have the fundamental responsibility to prepare journalists, and to send journalists who are both competent and interested. Although I was one of the few who had preparation prior to going to Moscow, none of my predecessors or successors had any language training.

The old-school editor says: Any reporter can go any place and do a story. Up to a point, this is true. But in places like Moscow and China, this is only half true. The editor has a tremendous responsibility to support the reporter.

I am troubled by the number of ambitious journalists who are trying to make a name for themselves in Moscow. They will compromise themselves journalistically. If they meet a Victor Louis, and Victor Louis stuffs beans up their nose, they will write it, and just cite "Soviet sources." If a journalist talks to Victor Louis as a source, they should put his name in the story. He is an international agent and should be identified by name. Likewise, if the source is someone from Novosti or the Foreign Ministry, the article should say so. And, it is the editor's responsibility to ask: Who is your source?

Another interesting phenomenon that will impact on the Soviet ability to feed information to correspondents is press conferences. The Soviets are giving so many press conferences

in Moscow that the resident correspondents do not have time to go out and do any enterprise reporting. During my own tenure in Moscow, I never went to a Foreign Ministry press conference in three years, except during the summit meetings. Now the Soviets almost overwhelm journalists with press conferences and news releases.

Mr. Kempe: Has the substance of what is being reported from Moscow changed? Do people write less about people now, and more about bureaucrats and press conferences?

Mr. Beeston: They write the same old stories. Everybody has covered the same old chestnuts for 20 years. Nothing changes.

Mr. Seeger: It also goes in waves. In the early 1970s, the politics were terribly dull. There was a turnover in the Politburo and we wrote about it. We ran around and watched them put up pictures and wrote about who was missing and so forth, but that was rather modest stuff. No one cared very much, and we did not know that much about why the changes were made anyway.

But the Jewish emigration movement was just starting, and from these people we learned a lot about how the USSR functioned. That was brand new. It was not just that those of us who were there were interested in this, but that suddenly we had sources of information.

Refuseniks would not only tell you their heartbreaking story, you could also question them. How did you get in the institute? What was required of you? What was it like working at this and that place? Correspondents learned a lot from these interactions.

Now the Soviets are presenting the official point of view in association with the name of an individual or a ministry. Correspondents in Moscow have to report what is being given to them in this way. In a sense, this is a diversionary tactic to keep them from focusing on other stories, such as how the economy is functioning or how the antialcoholism campaign is going.

Mr. Battye: Glasnost has been the Soviet approach for a year or so now. Apart from the changes in style, has there been any change in the way that Western journalists are treated in Moscow?

Mr. Seeger: The Soviets have shifted priority toward more manipulation and a little less intimidation. All the intimidation techniques are still there. One of the great questions we can never answer is what the balance is between the political and the security powers. For example, who

decided that US News & World Report journalist Nick Daniloff should be arrested? Was it the political leadership or not? My theory is that the KGB wanted to retaliate for what it thought was rulebreaking in New York vis-a-vis one of its own men. If I am right, this is a good example of the fact that the KGB still has great influence over how journalists are treated.

The Soviets are increasingly trying direct-dealing with journalists. Some Soviet diplomats who have served in the West are very close to Gorbachev. Dobrynin is one whom we all know very well. Former Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany Valentin M. Falin is now head of Novosti. They are all very, very smart fellows who have worked with and know the American press.

Dobrynin worked in this city for some 25 years and has a reputation for being above all the dirty stuff in Moscow. Even when he was elected a full member of the Central Committee, journalists resident in Washington treated him as some fellow who was really different than people in Kremlin. I defy anyone to ever show any evidence that Dobrynin did anything except carry out the strict orders of the Kremlin. And he is right back in Moscow running the place again.

Bailey: What proportion of information comes to Western journalists directly from Novosti?

Mr. Seeger: Novosti provides a translation service that produces a tremendous quantity of uninteresting articles. If it does translate what might be an interesting article, it leaves out the most important parts of it.

The most important role Novosti plays is setting up interviews and acting as guide on trips. Sometimes Novosti can be helpful, but its main function is to plant ideas.

Mr. Raymond: For the last six months, I would say the press has been fairly successfully manipulated. There is almost nothing that one sees coming out of Moscow except the stories that the Foreign Ministry and official sources are putting out. How do you cope with this problem?

Mr. Wallace: The USSR is increasingly sophisticated. I do not know whether this is the product of Dobrynin, but it certainly has kept journalists a lot busier with the Soviet version of ideas and events.

One solution is to ignore some of the press conferences. It is obviously easier for a magazine to do this than a newspaper or wire service. Last Monday's press conference is last century's news by the time the magazine comes out. But the newspaper and wire service journalists would have to

consciously ignore a certain amount of what the Soviets put out; a press conference missed might mean a headline missed. But it is important that the risk be taken, because manipulation is different than it used to be. Now it is designed to keep you busy. Other than the occasional Daniloff flap that comes along, the Soviets are not really threatening people. But they still have iron teeth, and you forget this at your peril.

Mr. Seeger: I am troubled when I see reporters talking about the great reforms of Gorbachev. They seem to be unaware of what Khrushchev did in his first year in office. The modern journalist is not very welleducated in substance. He is pretty well educated in techniques.

Another problem associated with Soviet manipulation is related to the great historic trend of old Russia and the Soviet Union to import technology. The Soviets have imported almost all their technology; now, they are importing public relations. They are using on us what American politicians and American corporations have used on the American press forever. And the Soviets have a tremendous advantage because they are doing something behaviorally different. We all are curious to know how deep, serious, and longlasting this is. The American press is fascinated by change, by innovation.

If reporters start to catch on that this is all PR and no substance, it will have negative consequences for the Soviet Union. The first reporters who somehow go beyond the briefings and the press conference, however, are very likely to get kicked out. The Soviets have kicked out and endangered more reporters in the last five years than they did in the early 1970s.

Panel 2: Reporting From the Third World

Bailey: The title of this panel is not entirely apt; the Third World is too large and diverse to really address in a single panel. There are, however, commonalities in the problems of reporting from these very different countries. The journalists who have agreed to discuss these issues have significant experience in many of the countries and regions of the Third World.

Mr. Michael Battye has been with Reuters since 1976, reporting first from Belgium before being assigned to Bangkok to cover Indochina for nearly three years. After a short stint in Yugoslavia, Mr. Battye reported from Lagos, Nigeria, until 1984, when he was posted to Washington, D.C. He has been the Reuters State Department correspondent since 1985.

Our second journalist-speaker prefers not to be identified by name in our written proceedings. He will be referred to throughout this session as Journalist A.

Our third speaker, Mr. Leonard Sussman, began his career as a journalist in the Caribbean. For the past 20 years, he has been executive director of Freedom House. During the past decade, he has focused his attention on the mass news media issues raised through UNESCO. He was vice-chairman of the US National Commission for UNESCO and is the author of numerous books on communications issues.

Let's start with Mr. Battye.

Mr. Battye: The two Third World countries that I have worked in as a journalist were very different from each other, and Soviet objectives in each were also quite different. The first was Thailand, where I served from 1978 to 1981, during which the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. The second was Nigeria.

We have two very senior Nigerian journalists present there, so I will limit my comments on that country. But I will say the Soviets were not up to much in Nigeria; they tended to let the Bulgarians take the lead.

The situation in Thailand when I was there was rather complicated for the Russians. They were interested in presenting the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as an act of necessity. The Khmer Rouge were thoroughly awful people and somebody had to do something about it. The Vietnamese did.

The Soviets in Bangkok were not particularly wellliked. They tend not to fit into Asia very well, and they did not have anybody to talk to. But they can readily get published whatever articles they wish. As you all know, the Soviets frequently bribe Third World journalists.

What surprised me in Thailand was that the Soviets targeted the foreign press. At the Foreign Correspondents Club in Thailand, which was open to diplomats, journalists, and businessmen, there were three or four Russians who were members. One of them was the TASS man; the other three were political operatives from the Embassy.

Once I was at the club and began talking to the Soviets. After the TASS man had made introductions, one of the political characters latched onto me. Subsequently, he maintained contact with me, mostly by calling me up at the office from a street phone in Bangkok. The Soviet often invited me to lunch at a Hungarian restaurant. I was never allowed to pick up the bill. The conversation was fairly pedestrian. My assumption through several months of this was that, as I was particularly active on the Thai-Cambodian border after the Vietnamese had invaded, I had information that he could not get because he was not allowed to go to the border. He was interested in what the Chinese were up to, because the Chinese were supporting the Khmer Rouge.

Once, after I had not seen him for a while, he called me from the usual pay phone and invited me to the usual lunch. He said, "I have been back in Moscow for my summer vacation, and I'm very out of touch. So tell me, why is the Japanese Foreign Minister coming here?"

Now, the Japanese Foreign Minister was not traveling much in those days so this was considered a pretty important visit. When I told my luncheon host he would be able to read my stories on the wire, he protested and asked me to write him a paper. What he really wanted was for me to write and sign a paper for him. Presumably he would drop it in my file and use it against me in the future.

A colleague had a similar experience. He had the same introduction from the same TASS man to a different political officer at the Soviet Embassy. They had their lunches at the same Hungarian restaurant. My colleague was an American reporter who was writing things for his magazine that the US Embassy did not like. I suspect the Soviets decided they had an opportunity in him.

At the end of one of my colleague's lunches, as he was standing outside the Hungarian restaurant door, the Soviet turned to him and said, "You know, meeting with me like this could get you into trouble with the American Embassy, and don't you think you're in enough trouble with the Embassy already?" My colleague replied that it was normal for journalists to meet with diplomats. The Soviet then said, "Isn't it possible that the American Embassy might get hold of a tape recording of our conversations or maybe they have film of us meeting together?" My colleague replied, "You are telling me that you've recorded

our conversations and had pictures taken of us together. Go ahead, tell the Embassy."

After I had said no to writing the paper for my contact, and after my colleague had refused to be intimidated, we never saw the Soviets again. Their attempts to recruit us failed.

Some time later, after I had moved on to Belgrade, a Yugoslav colleague of mine, who was very well plugged in, came to me one day and said, "Let's take a walk." As we walked, he asked, "Do you know what is in your Secret Service file here?" He proceeded to inform me. The details are not important, but overall it was very damaging information. It could only have been passed on to the Yugoslavs by the Soviets in Bangkok. I presume that, because I had not cooperated with them in Bangkok, they were going to stymie me in Belgrade.

Dr. Bailey: Thank you, Mr. Battye. And now, our second speaker.

Journalist A: Disinformation is not new. The spreading of rumors or misinformation is old as the world is or at least as old as the confrontation between political foes. There is a difference in our current world: The Great Powers have resources unparalleled in history. They are struggling for minds and hearts of publics with highly sophisticated skills.

The Third World provides the most fertile ground for disinformation. Many of these countries have a love-hate relationship with the US which ultimately facilitates the effect of disinformation. Successful disinformation depends, in part, on a combination of ignorance, fear, hate, and negative perceptions.

Many Latin Americans, for example, consider the US to be an imperialist conqueror and a real enemy. History demonstrates that. So who would be surprised if somebody blamed the US for anything wrong that might happen in Latin America?

A few years ago, a Mexican newspaper published a story saying that a drought in Mexico, which occurred in about 1977, was actually due to CIA efforts to control the weather. This story was widely circulated. Even if this story came from ideological enemies of the US, for many people it became an uncontested truth. Some people still recall the newspaper story and cite it as proof of US guilt.

It is not by accident that disinformation plays better in countries that mistrust or dislike the US. If a story against the US looks truthful, even though it is not, it will find its way to newspapers. It will become a public thought. In the Third World, there are extremes. Some people will believe anything said by a US official or by a US newspaper. Others

will believe anything that is said against the US. If one's views are nationalist or even slightly anti-US, whatever the US does will be perceived as negative.

Wild accusations can have impact beyond the effects of the immediate story. If Cuba once claimed US bacteriological warfare research was responsible for a plague of black fever, years later in other countries, another plague will be once again blamed on the US. Similarly, if the CIA intervened previously in the private affairs of one country, other incidents will later be blamed on the CIA, whether that agency had anything to do with the events or not.

It is also important to note that in Latin America, and perhaps in other Third World countries, journalists tend to be liberal or nationalist and tend also to believe the worst of the United States. Thus, they are more susceptible to Soviet information and disinformation, particularly if it is channeled through Cuban journalists, with whom they have not only a shared language but also a similar perspective.

This is not to say that the USSR is not directly involved in influencing Latin American journalists. The Soviet Union and bloc countries organize seminars and trips to their countries. Latin journalists, who are generally poor, are greatly influenced by an all-paid trip to the Soviet Union with the chance to meet high officials and to learn firsthand about the USSR. These Latin Americans are unafraid of the communists and the Soviet Union. Latin America has never been hurt by the Soviets; but it has been hurt by the US.

Bailey: Thank you. Mr. Sussman.

Mr. Sussman: Disinformation has technical definitions, but it can be understood as contrived misinformation with the objective of deceiving. Back in 505 B.C., Sun Tzu, the Chinese military writer, said all warfare was based on deception. Disinformation is warfare by other than military means.

The wholesale manufacturer of disinformation since 1919 has been the Soviet Union. Its major objective in recent years has been the denigration of the United States and its allies. The field of warfare, most of the time, is the Third World, where developing countries maintain residual anticolonial emotions, claim larger shares of global economic and informational resources, and consider themselves politically nonaligned (with some leaning toward Moscow and some toward Washington). All fear superpower influences, and most are skeptical of overtures from one or the other superpower. In that climate of residual mistrust and supplication, the field is ripe for playing to the emotions of the Third World audience.

This audience is relatively easy to reach in the Third World because of the state of journalism, as well as the state of mind. Inadequate communications, press libraries, and staff training--all facilitate the misuse of Third World journalism for Soviet purposes. All of this is assisted by carefully placed Soviet funding of Third World news media and occasional payoffs to journalists.

Disinformation is successful when it documents what people already believe or want to believe. But how does disinformation work?

On April 13, 1983, two Nigerian newspapers, the Nigerian Tribune and the Daily Sketch, published a memorandum allegedly written by US Ambassador Thomas Pickering ordering the assassination of two Unity Party leaders. The US Embassy immediately declared the memo a forgery, but that denial probably would not have been believed had not the forgers used the words "wet affairs" in describing the alleged deed. "Wet affairs" has no meaning for Americans, of course. It is a direct translation from Russian meaning "assassination."

The story, nevertheless, was reprinted by the wire services and then published in Europe by the official Czechoslovak newspaper, Rude Pravo. Once disinformation enters the major communication networks, it can have a long life and even grow in credibility as it is repeated.

Another example was a forged letter published in The New Statesman, London, November 5, 1982. The letter, addressed to Jeane Kirkpatrick, then-US Ambassador to the United Nations, thanked her for special services rendered to the head of South African military intelligence. Only the printed letterhead was real.

India is a prime target for Soviet disinformation. Soon after the Union Carbide accident at Bhopal December 3, 1984, the USSR exploited the event. Radio Moscow on December 12 said the Union Carbide insecticide plant had been experimenting with toxic gases for use in chemical warfare. The accusation was picked up by the Press Trust of India, which frequently uses Soviet-generated information. Several days later, the respected Indian daily, The Statesman, asserted outright that, "The Union Carbide plant conducted secret experiments with lethal chemicals." Radio Moscow then picked up and replayed the story, attributing it to The Statesman.

The managing editor of The Statesman, when asked for his explanation of the newspaper's role, said, "I do have to acknowledge that when the tragedy took place in Bhopal, we did not have a man in position and had to rely on Indian agency copy for awhile." The inflammatory stories, he said, "are all derived from this. But soon thereafter we made amends." But of course, Radio Moscow did not pick up the amends.

The current Soviet concoction is a classic in disinformation. The charge grips the attention of every reader, for everyone is a potential victim. The story charges that the AIDS virus was an American creation that escaped from a US biological warfare laboratory. The story appeared in October 1985 in Literaturnaya Gazeta, a Soviet weekly, which cited its source as the Patriot, a pro-Soviet New Delhi newspaper. The story was picked up from the Soviet paper by several news agencies and began to appear in newspapers around the world. Although Soviet publications continued to repeat the story, it did not have a very broad impact until a year later.

On October 25, 1986, the Sunday Express of London published the story. Wire services again carried it, and the story was repeated in newspapers worldwide. The USSR media continue to push the disinformation and uninformed correspondents continue to pick it up and spread it.

The disinformation exploits not only raw fear of infection and death, but also the always-volatile emotions generated by alleged racism and the victimization of the poor and defenseless. Since the cause of AIDS cannot yet be determined, the charge against American warmongers is placed by the unsophisticated among the few credible sources of the dread disease.

The larger goals of the Soviet disinformation story are clear. Moscow Radio claims that outbreaks of AIDS overseas occur "near American war bases." The Turks, for example, have been urged to close US bases because of "devastating danger of an epidemic of AIDS."

The Greek newspaper Ethnos has republished the Sunday Express's sensational article at a time when US-Greek relations are sensitive. But then, Ethnos is a perennial source of disinformation. In a libel suit in London last month, Ethnos was both defendant and plaintiff. Ethnos first sued London's The Economist for publishing that the Greek daily was controlled by the KGB. The Economist countersued Ethnos for charging that the British publication had CIA ties.

During the trial The Economist showed that Soviet funds had largely created Ethnos and that the newspaper was blatantly and regularly pro-Soviet while pretending to be serving Greek national objectives. During the trial, a KGB defector, Ilya Dzhirkevlov, said he was personally involved in the use of several journalists and newspapers in the West as channels for planting propaganda, often without the publications being consciously aware of it. He said, for example, that he was personally involved in arranging financing and setting up the Patriot newspaper in India. So we come full circle. The Patriot, the Indian paper that started the AIDS-made-in-the-US

story, is now said by a KGB defector to have been a KGB creation.

There is an interesting postscript to this reiteration of the AIDS disinformation saga. Every month, the widely circulated magazine New African awards a prize for the best letter received that month. This March, a few weeks ago, one Geyre Jama of Abu Dhabi, UAE (United Arab Emirates), wrote a letter headlined "Was AIDS American Made?" He recited the disinformation that AIDS "escaped" from a secret lab at Fort Detrick, Maryland. For that, Jama won the month's prize "for the most original and stimulating contribution" to African thought.

How can disinformation be countered? It is difficult to detect quickly, and it is difficult to disseminate to the same public the truth about the untruth. It is almost impossible for a correction to reach the same public that received the error or untruth. It is even more difficult when stories are contrived to reinforce biases or fears already imbedded in human belief systems. But we must try to counter disinformation, and truth is the obvious weapon--truth widely circulated with credible responses and an indication of who gains by spreading disinformation.

Indeed, since journalists are the advance guard, they should be the first to apply skepticism to charges which immediately appear highly newsworthy or even sensational. Proper warning labels should be added to stories whose sources or themes appear questionable.

Since American journalism is readily receptive to anti-American, antiestablishment stories, journalists should recognize that such elements are inviting subjects for the disinformers. The purported revelation of secret information provides an added fillip. When such elements originate in Third World countries, another caution sign should be up. Third World outlets are easier to penetrate or control.

At the end of the day, the integrity and professionalism of the independent journalist are the best protection against the clever, increasingly sophisticated Soviet disinformers.

Bailey: Thank you, Mr. Sussman. Are there questions for the panelists?

Mr. Murphy: Your comments on Soviet attempts, often very successful, to penetrate the Third World media were very enlightening. Do you have any insights on the Soviet-East European and the Cuban attempts to train journalists, offer them scholarships to study journalism in Prague or Moscow, or provide paper, printing presses, and other physical means for actually disseminating information? For example, are Third

World journalists often approached to join the International Union of Journalists, the Soviet front organization?

Journalist A: Many of the left-to-liberal journalists in Latin America belong to a union that facilitates scholarships and trips, mostly to the socialist countries. These contacts with socialists are very important in achieving balance. How could you present, for instance, the Associated Press stories about the Soviet Union without trying to present the TASS stories about the same subject? How could you balance your information if you only reported what is perceived as the American side of the story?

Mr. Izobo: I represent the Nigeria Union of Journalists, am a member of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and work as a correspondent for the News Agency of Nigeria.

The Nigerian Union of Journalists, although it belongs to the IOJ, does have some members who have a Western orientation. We have been holding meetings on topics such as why America is against the Third World new information order. No one has offered, during my 30-day visit here, to come to Africa and jointly sponsor a seminar to talk about such topics.

This lack of interest in Nigeria by America is evident when you compare Soviet activities with those of the US. What Western people regard as disinformation, Nigeria regards as the Soviet Union trying to establish its influence within our system. But America shows no positive interest in establishing influence. The Soviet Union gives Nigerian journalists at least 10 scholarships. Sometimes we do not even have enough journalists to fill all of the available scholarship slots. Western governments do not show such positive interest.

Maybe the USSR is involved in disinformation, but the US is also. For example, US sources have claimed that half the African population will die of AIDS very soon. And the US media have said that AIDS comes from monkeys, and monkeys are found in Africa, and therefore AIDS has to be an African disease. This is an act of disinformation that is perpetrated not only by media but also by the Western authorities against the developing world.

Like many here have said, the developing world unfortunately happens to be the battleground, and it will remain so until the developing countries acquire the means to tell the world about themselves. The information published in Nigerian newspapers about Ghana, for example, comes from AP or Reuters, not from a Ghana News Agency, Ghana newspaper, or Ghana sources. This is why the idea of a Third World information order is so important.

Bailey: The opposition of the US Government, such as it is, to what you call a new information order in part stems from the fact that the USSR has coopted it. It is important that any new "information order" not be just another front for Novosti or TASS, but that it be truly independent.

Mr. Sussman: The first question, on the Soviet interest in Third World communications is extremely important. It is instructive to look at the International Organization of Journalists, which is an amazing operation. Financed by the Soviet Union, it is the largest producer of journalism books and magazines in the world. These are published in many languages. The IOJ conducts many different seminars around the world and has fulltime schools in four or five countries. Its purpose is to attract Third World journalism and journalists to the Soviet position.

IOJ training has pluses and minuses for journalists. A trip abroad enables them to see more of the world. We in the West ought to understand that our side of the story is ignored because we are not at all competitive with the IOJ. The reason that the West does not compete with the IOJ is because of the basic philosophical assumption of a separation, a very stringent separation, between government and the press.

There has been great misunderstanding, particularly in the United States, about what the objectives of the New World Information Order are. It is not a Soviet effort, but is essentially a Third World effort taken over from time to time by the Soviets for their own purposes.

Mr. Battye: Given that the Third World is such an intense battleground for influence and that the press is such an important player, Western news organizations ought to pay more attention to raising the standards of Third World journalism. This would be the best defense against disinformation.

For instance, there was once an unbearably crude forgery that should have fooled nobody. Yet it was on the front page of two Nigerian newspapers. Had there been a top-quality editor on either newspaper, the forgery could never have got published for any reason other than political. Because there is an instinctive anti-Western--not just anti-American, but anti-Western--bias in many ex-colonial countries, the Soviets can take advantage. Only high standards and good journalistic training can overcome the effects of this bias.

Mr. White: The Los Angeles Times last week had an enormous piece on the front page about the Nigerian press. It said Nigeria's was the best press in Africa.

I have two criticisms I would like to offer. First, we are addressing the wrong question. The central question is whether

Gorbachev is attempting to change Soviet society. If so, in which way? Will he succeed, and is it in our interests that he should succeed or fail? Rather than addressing these questions, today's debate is being held in what I would call pre-Gorbachev terms. It is strikingly curious and anachronistic.

Second, I believe that all great powers have the need, like Churchill said, to protect their version of the truth with a bodyguard of lies. The United States in recent years has generated many examples of what can only fairly be described as disinformation.

Earlier, Dr. Bailey was able quite easily to dispose of the Poindexter memorandum and the so-called Libyan disinformation of last summer. But there are other examples. The "Soviet moondust in the Embassy" story surfaced last year just before a critical phase of negotiations. Every time there is a vote on contra aid, we are told there is another Soviet brigade or crate full of MiG 23's in Nicaragua. Western newspapers are often less skeptical then they should be about such stories.

We European journalists expect such disinformation from governments. Because European papers are traditionally more partisan, they expect governments to manipulate them. When we discovered in November, thanks to a Pulitzer Prize winner in Beirut (he didn't get the prize as he should have), that the Reagan administration had been less than candid in the matter of the Iran-contra connection, it was not surprising to Europeans. Americans were surprised at the extent to which their media--their immense strength, virtues, and energy--had allowed itself to be manipulated.

You should not view my comments as a reflection of European pinko-wimpism. Ask the Canadians. They, like the Nigerians and the Mexicans, feel exactly the same way paradoxically about the enormous success of American society in spreading its perception, its values, and sometimes its disinformation upon societies less able to resist.

Bailey: You started with a question about whether Gorbachev is truly a breath of fresh air, making changes that will last. His regime is really not that different with respect to Soviet disinformation. Many of the Soviet disinformation campaigns we have talked about predated Gorbachev's era. Since Gorbachev's arrival, however, there have been at least three noteworthy disinformation campaigns.

This year a book was published in Moscow entitled The CIA and the Jonestown Massacre. The book alleges the CIA killed everyone at Jonestown in Guyana because Jim Jones wanted to take his troop and emigrate to the Soviet Union. It may seem absurd to people in this room, but this story is believed by

many audiences. The Gorbachev regime--through an official government publishing house--is responsible for propagating this story.

Another medium, videotape, is used for the second disinformation campaign. The Soviets produced a one-hour program entitled "Who Killed Olaf Palme." It presents such data as the fact that he was killed with an American-made Smith and Wesson gun, along with insinuation throughout the film that the United States assassinated the Swedish Prime Minister. I have seen this film myself. At the end an authoritative-sounding commentator asks, "Who killed Olaf Palme?" Another solemn voice replies, "All roads lead to the CIA."

A third major disinformation campaign of the Gorbachev era is the so-called baby scam, which accuses the US of kidnapping Third World children to use their organs for "spare parts." The campaign started in Guatemala, I believe, and although it is probably Cuban-sponsored, it does benefit the Soviet Union. The USSR has played an active role in picking up the story and repeating it worldwide. The story is now making its way around the Third World. It has appeared in South Asia and Africa, having started in Latin America.

So, there are some examples of why the problem of Soviet disinformation continues even in an era of glasnost. A previous speaker made the very good point that one cannot really have a tremendous effect on whether people perceive one's policies and actions as bad or good, because their judgment is based on their own values. One can, however, try to make sure that people understand what one's policies and actions are, so that any judgment will be based on reality.

Journalist A: I agree very much with my Nigerian colleague. I think that the Western World has been terribly shy in its attempts to try to get closer to Third World journalists. Part of the reason is that Westerners do not have experiences or understanding that enable them to communicate with Third World journalists.

The American media, which are independent of the government, are so committed to the social-political system of this country. As a result, they interpret all events in the Third World according to American values. Sometimes this interpretation is wrong.

Mr. Martin: When I came to this country in 1968, I came as a defector. I spent 14 years in the communist intelligence system from 1954 to 1968, and I defected when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia.

For two years, I headed the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department, designing hundreds and hundreds of disinformation campaigns and operations, mainly against the US, all over the world. When I came here and started talking to journalists and scholars in 1970, after the debriefing period, I mentioned the word "disinformation." Most of them looked very skeptical; many did not understand the term. Some viewed me as a cold warrior.

We have made great progress. Today we are here to discuss various aspects of disinformation, and many prominent journalists are present.

When you examine a single Soviet disinformation event or campaign, it does not lead you to feel threatened. You think, "This cannot change the social system in the United States or Europe." But you must go beyond the single event or campaign and focus on the cumulative effect. The Soviets understand that disinformation must be produced on a mass scale for a long period of time, after which this quantity will eventually change into quality.

By the way, the USSR is not the sole originator of disinformation. I estimate that about 80 percent of disinformation messages begin in Eastern Europe. Twenty percent start elsewhere, including in the US.

The only way to fight disinformation is for journalists, the messengers, to be aware, because they are the primary target. To manipulate the public, the press has to be manipulated first. But it is not just the press. Anyone sent abroad should know something about disinformation, about the basic techniques, the way they are orchestrated, how these operations are conducted. The best protection against disinformation is knowledge of how it works.

Mr. Romerstein: I have a couple of comments on various points that have been made. First, with regard to the New World Information Order, the US position generally is that anything that broadens a marketplace of ideas is good, and anything that restricts it--such as censorship or other controls--is bad.

My second point is on the International Organization of Journalists and the comment made by our Nigerian colleague who said that there are noncommunists in the IOJ. The IOJ is one of about a dozen international Soviet fronts, and because it is a front, it naturally has members who are not communists. Otherwise, what would be the sense in having it? It could be called the "International Organization of Communist Journalists," and everybody would know exactly what it is. Front groups like the IOJ need nonCommunists in order to perform their functions.

The IOJ has a network of about a dozen training schools around the world to train young journalists. These journalists learn much more than standard tools of the trade; they are ideologically indoctrinated. Last year, I spoke to an editor of a major Arab newspaper who told me that when he got Associated Press or UPI material in English, his IOJ-trained staff would totally distort the contents when translating it into Arabic.

My research assistant is a Muslim from a Muslim country. Recently, her cousin told her a story that is circulating in his country--that a spray is being used on the veils of Muslim women which causes the sign of the cross to appear on the veils. He said, "You know, it's so ridiculous, but this is what they are saying in the villages. They think it is either American Christians or Zionist Jews who are doing this."

Regardless of how silly the story may be, it illustrates the point made earlier that there is often a predisposition of the target audience to believe anything bad about the United States or, in this case, about our close ally Israel.

The Soviets are aware of the different levels of receptivity to their disinformation. In fact, there is a dichotomy in what the Soviets themselves say. In the current AIDS disinformation campaign, for example, the KGB and the Soviet propaganda apparatus are spreading the false story that the AIDS virus came from American laboratories. But Dr. Zhdanov, the leading Soviet physician working with American doctors on solving the AIDS problem, openly admits that AIDS is a natural phenomenon and is not produced in a laboratory.

When I raised this contradiction in official Soviet stance with a representative from the Soviet Embassy here, he responded, "That shows we are a pluralistic society!" We both laughed. What it really shows is not pluralism, but division of labor. The serious Soviet scientists tell the truth, whereas the disinformation campaigns are devised and executed by another segment of the government.

The current issue of Moscow News again has an article by Dr. Segal, the Soviet-born East German who sometimes pretends to be French, saying that AIDS was developed at Fort Detrick. Such lies are of concern to us. The free marketplace of ideas is very important, but forgeries and disinformation planted by KGB in the free marketplace are something that we have the responsibility to expose.

Mr. Battye: But everybody conducts disinformation campaigns. What seems to be so aggravating about Soviet disinformation is the relative crudity of it. Third World countries probably believe that Western stories from governments--such as from the Central Office of Information in

Britain or USIA in the United States--constitute disinformation. They differ from Soviet disinformation in that they are much more sophisticated and subtle.

Bailey: Have you, as a journalist, seen US or UK disinformation in the Third World?

Mr. Battye: Disinformation? We get into a gray area when we talk about Western disinformation.

Bailey: We defined the term as lies introduced to manipulate people's perceptions and/or opinions. Do you have evidence of US or UK disinformation?

Mr. Battye: The West is a great deal more subtle. There are about 40 current daily newspapers in Nigeria. The British, US, and Soviet embassies all try to plant their articles.

Bailey: Yes. But do these constitute disinformation?

Mr. Battye: No, I am not saying that.

Mr. Romerstein: Let's make sure what we are talking about. USIA does not hand out forgeries and false information. It distributes, in the name of the US Government, information that the US wants available to the world. We have a right and an obligation to tell the truth. If you find us not telling the truth, you call us on it.

Mr. White: When the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), on the fourth day of Chernobyl, says that there has been a second meltdown, is that disinformation or is that a genuine error in judgment?

Mr. Romerstein: DIA made no such announcement. That was speculation fueled by the press. You got it from somebody who said he got it from somebody who said he got it from somebody. The United States puts out specific information, without trying to hide the source, and we are very happy if you attribute it to us when you get it.

In regard to Chernobyl, there was both misinformation and disinformation that was circulated. The Western European and American press carried what proved to be a significant amount of erroneous information about Chernobyl. The current issue of Moscow News attributes that misinformation to the stonewalling done by the Soviet Government, which prevented the public from having a clear idea of what was happening at Chernobyl. The American press was so desperate for news that it relied on irresponsible sources.

Journalist A: From the Third World point of view, there is very little difference between misinformation and disin-

formation. But let me cite an example of disinformation: the campaign directed by Colonel North on Nicaragua. The US perceives that Nicaragua poses danger to the freedom of the world or the freedom of the hemisphere. By telling other countries that you believe this, you are participating in a disinformation campaign.

Bailey: I would like to remind everyone of our working definition for this conference. Disinformation is "factual error introduced for the purpose of manipulating people's perceptions." Misinformation is "a mistake or incomplete, misleading information presented unintentionally." Propaganda is "value-laden statements reflecting a particular position or perception." Let's try to focus our attention specifically on disinformation.

Mr. Murphy: Disinformation is also distinguished, often, by an effort to hide the source of the information. Propaganda does not try to hide the source.

Bailey: Yes. If USIA, for example, hands out a document which says the US Government believes that Nicaragua is a danger to its neighbors, that is a perception. That may be propaganda, but it is not disinformation.

Mr. Garrity: I have been with USIA for 22 years, and I don't know how many times I've had people come up to me and say, "Aren't you really an intelligence agency?" I answer that, since we deal with foreign policy, there is obviously no intelligence in what we are doing! Seriously though, we have represented the policies of a succession of administrations since the agency was founded in 1953. It is important for countries around the world to know what the US policy is on any given event. Believe me, for USIA to grasp the policy and present it in a straight, accurate, understandable way takes every resource that we have. We have neither the organization nor the resources to promote disinformation, even if we wanted to. If other countries do not like US policy, that's their privilege, but it is important for them to know what the policy is.

Mr. Izobo: Presently, because of an unfortunate atmosphere of mistrust, USIA's information is really propaganda. USIA's materials are no longer serving useful purposes to the media, because they are actually misinformation. Misinformation can also be disinformation. People adopt disinformation because they are misinformed.

Panel 3: Reporting From the Industrialized World

Bailey: Like the session on the Third World, there are problems with the title of this panel. The industrialized world is a set of very diverse countries. However, there are commonalities which we can address. One of the questions we can address is: What are the similarities and differences between active measures as practiced in the US, Europe, and Japan?

Our first two speakers prefer not to be identified in the published proceedings of this conference. We will refer to them as Journalists B and C.

The third speaker is Mr. Peter Samuel, who has reported for the Canberra Times and the Australian weekly The Bulletin. Since 1980, he has been in this country, first as US manager of the Australian Consolidated Press and, since 1982, as the special Washington correspondent for the News Group Publications, writing chiefly for The Australian, that country's leading national daily newspaper.

Journalist B: My experience in the Western World is that there is too much information. It is very difficult for a journalist. Increasingly, a correspondent is actually a kind of conveyor belt from what the US television network news or The New York Times says. It is very difficult for a foreign correspondent in the United States, unless he belongs to a big agency or wire service, to conduct interviews or do original research. When I arrived, I was lucky enough to get an interview with President Reagan. Someone told me that it would be downhill from there, and it has been.

For the foreign correspondent from a small country, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that the primary audience for the US administration is domestic. The foreign press is secondary.

The US domestic press can be excellent. Watergate was the result of splendid work by the press. What I admire most in the American press is the antagonistic attitude that it has toward the government. It is one of the checks and balances that we in Europe envy very much. The reporting of the American press on political affairs is quite good.

But the US press is like the US Government in that it does not care about foreign affairs very much. The United States is quite insulated from what happens abroad. It is quite difficult to find Americans who are really involved in foreign affairs unless that is their specialty. By contrast, Europeans are much more international in outlook.

The American system is very open to the foreign press. We can travel widely and talk to anyone. I have never seen a place like this where I can lift the phone and talk to a great economist, scientist, or military officer and be able to quote them openly. This is extraordinary; it does not really happen anywhere else in the world.

Let me turn to the subject of disinformation. Political disinformation is a very important and substantial part of Soviet policy. It is carefully planned and it is designed at the top. The United States also practices disinformation, but it is not a substantial, integral part of its policy. It simply happens from time to time. When it does, it is often balanced by the rigorous US press.

In Italy, there is a highly politicized public and press. Practically all the 20 or so parties have their own voice in the press. People know what political perspective to expect when they choose one paper instead of another. Also, in Europe there are state-owned television and radio stations. Overall, this makes it more difficult to manipulate public opinion in Western Europe than it is in the United States. The propensity for press manipulation in the US is exacerbated by the fact that it is very close to a kind of monarchy for whatever period there is a strong President in power. A strong President is in a good position to manipulate the press, more so than are West European leaders.

One other point I would like to make concerns the methods by which the Soviets make inroads into other societies. In Italy, for example, the Communist Party has a dual strategy of courting the intelligentsia and, on the other hand, organizing festivals and other attractions for the masses. It picks issues which are both familiar and popular, such as defense of the environment, the quality of life in towns, and so on. It finances these movements and, ultimately, gets them to sign on to the Soviet perspective on a host of international issues--issues that do not necessarily have to do with environment, quality of life, or whatever the central theme of the movement is.

Bailey: Thanks. And now our second panelist.

Journalist C: The so-called industrialized democracies are not so susceptible to disinformation or active measures, because their societies are mostly sophisticated and literate. When the story appeared claiming that AIDS was invented in US laboratories and spread, we printed it not because we believed it but because it was news--a piece of information that people were talking about. I doubt that anyone in Japan, Australia, and Western Europe actually believes the AIDS disinformation. Who would make a virus, for the purpose of a weapon, which has to be transmitted by either sexual or intravenous means?

Similarly, the so-called Jonestown disinformation is so ridiculous that Americans should rest assured that the story will backfire.

Of much greater damage to the US is information or disclosure about some of the illegal or unethical activities of the United States. I cannot remember the specifics, but there was once an experiment by the US military which released bacteria in a subway in San Francisco. This kind of activity is far more harmful to the United States than any of the millions of Soviet active measures combined.

Relative to US handling of foreign correspondents, Soviet behavior leaves much to be desired. For example, some reporters mentioned earlier the harassment of their wives during their stay in the Soviet Union. If the USSR were to stop such practices, the US would have a more challenging competitor. There are over 60 Japanese correspondents in Washington--more than twice as many as West Germans or the British, the runners-up. The wives of these correspondents enjoy American life here and have never been harassed by US authorities. Efforts to manipulate would eventually backfire.

Bailey: Thank you. Now, Mr. Samuel, please.

Mr. Samuel: What are the objectives of Soviet active measures in Australia? First, the USSR wants to disrupt the defense relationship between Australia and the United States. One means of doing that is to blacken the name of the United States while simultaneously playing on Australian nationalism. This is accomplished by producing stories about American attempts to manipulate Australia and its politics. This objective is shared by the large, indigenous leftist movement, which includes communists. In fact, when examining Soviet active measures versus what might be simply indigenous communist active measures, it becomes very difficult to disentangle the two.

The Soviets have been very active in Australia over many years, going right back to the formation of communist parties in the 1920s and 1930s. Australia can claim one of the world's great agents of influence, the late Wilfred Burchett--an extraordinary activist and journalist who spent a career working effectively for communist regimes while generally retaining his reputation for being a legitimate, independent journalist. Since he died, it has been clearly established that he was always working for communist regimes--China, North Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. He died in Bulgaria at age 72 in September 1983.

In June 1985, Robert Manne, a professor of political science at Latrobe University, found in Burchett's personal papers in Melbourne a letter from Burchett in Peking in April

1951 to his father saying, "I don't have to worry about finances here...I am relieved of all financial cares" (Quadrant magazine, August 1985). Burchett was on some government payroll and provided with a house, servants, office supplies, etc., while being ostensibly a freelance journalist. That letter was written in April 1951, just months before Burchett moved into North Korea with Chinese Communist troops.

During the Korean war, Burchett specialized in US atrocity stories and is credited with concocting the charge that the US was engaged in "germ warfare." He played a major role in the anti-Western, principally anti-American, propaganda campaign. Prisoners of war later said Burchett was involved in their interrogations and doctored their forced confessions. These false confessions by American and British POWs were used in propaganda campaigns. But, because Burchett was apparently an independent Australian journalist, his publications of the coerced confessions were not seen for what they were--disinformation. It was a classic case of using a journalist as an agent of influence.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organization made the assessment, according to recently declassified documents, that Burchett was "under the command of General Chung San Man of the North Korean Foreign Ministry during the course of the Korean war"--apparently assigned to them by the Chinese. We now know, after his death, that he was secretly decorated for his services to North Korea in 1967 by Kim Il-sung. In his personal papers, Burchett says that Kim described him in the secret award ceremony as "an old comrade in arms."

Professor Manne writes that there is persuasive evidence that Burchett was recruited by the KGB's predecessor, the MVD, when he was working for the London Daily Express in Berlin. He apparently had been a communist for over 10 years and may have been a secret member of the Australian Communist Labor Party as a youth. A former KGB man, Krotkov, testified in US Senate hearings that he met Burchett in Moscow and was involved in getting him set up there.

During the course of the Vietnam war, Burchett's career reached its climax. In his home country he was regarded very widely as a propagandist for Hanoi, but not in America! The American media treated Burchett as though he were an independent and objective reporter. New York Times Books published his memoirs, and Harrison Salisbury lionized Burchett, praising him as one of the most objective reporters on the war. In fact, however, I think it is fair to say that Burchett never wrote a single line damaging to the communist cause.

I did some reporting in Vietnam and Cambodia between 1966 and 1970. It was well known in journalistic circles in Saigon

and Phnom Penh that if you wanted access to the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese, you courted Burchett. He was their adviser on which journalists should be allowed onto their turf. No journalist regarded unfavorably by Burchett got into Hanoi or into Vietcong areas.

There is fascinating testimony from Edwin Morrisby, an Australian filmmaker who knew and liked Burchett and worked with him on films in Indochina in the late 1960s. In Quadrant, October 1985, Burchett's filmmaking colleague recounted several points:

- Burchett told him in early 1967 the Vietnamese Communist high command did not think it could win the war militarily, but that it could win "at the public relations level."

- Burchett was able to get "full cooperation on an exclusive basis" from the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the North Vietnamese.

- NLF film and facilities were used in the making of the Burchett-Morrisby film, and NLF material was simply incorporated in it.

- TV in the US, UK, Holland, Ireland, Scandinavia, Canada, and Eastern Europe (but not, to our credit, in Australia) bought Burchett's film ("The Third Arrow").

- On a visit to Phnom Penh in mid-1969, Burchett's and Morrisby's tickets were prepaid by unknown sources in East Berlin and, on their arrival, they were met by an NLF representative who assured them all their expenses in-country would be paid.

- They used a North Vietnamese-supplied cameraman.

- At the Paris airport before one film trip, Burchett was given a bulky envelope by a North Vietnamese. Burchett opened it to reveal five bundles of American Express travelers checks in $100 denominations, and he estimated there were about 10 in each bundle; that is, around US$5,000.

- Burchett told him he had "subbed" (Australian slang for edited) the Korean POW confessions, complaining that the POWs were quite inarticulate and journalistic license had to be used to get a usable story out of them.

Burchett lived far better than a journalist could as a freelancer. He owned a splendid house at Meudon on the outskirts of Paris in the direction of Versailles and a villa

in Phnom Penh, drove a Volvo, drank the best French wines, and traveled the world constantly.

Burchett fiercely fought any suggestion he was a Soviet agent. I was unusual in writing bluntly that he was a Soviet agent in a piece I did in the late 1960s--a piece without a byline in an obscure right-wing Democratic Labor Party publication with a tiny circulation of about 2,000, called Focus. I personally wrote every issue of this little monthly piece of pamphleteering for about four years as moonlight work for about $50 per 5,000 words.

One of many dozens of things I dashed off was a tirade against Burchett. A few months later, I heard from the publisher he had got a libel suit on it from Burchett himself. It was one of Australia's most elaborate libel cases ever, costing millions of dollars and witnesses brought from all over the world. We eventually won, but I was probably the only person ever to call Burchett a Soviet agent publicly during his life, and I did it almost absentmindedly in a little piece of dashed-off anonymous pamphleteering, that I would never have dared write under my own name.

I have dealt with Burchett at some length because it is clear now he was a major Soviet agent of influence serving multiple pro-Soviet regimes. He would not have been so useful in molding Western opinion in a direction helpful to Soviet interests had he been identified for what he was, during his lifetime.

A combination of factors worked to mask Burchett's true identity. First, there was the prevailing political culture of anti-anticommunism, or "no enemies on the left," in the Western media. To identify Burchett as a communist would be to brand oneself "McCarthyist" (I did it anonymously). Second, Western counterintelligence was incompetent; it never clearly established Burchett's "agent" status.

Although Burchett was a major agent of influence on behalf of the Soviet bloc, the most celebrated agent of influence was the former national secretary of the ruling Australian Labor Party, David Combe. In May 1983, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization revealed that Combe was in regular contact with a local Soviet Embassy man, Valeriy Ivanov of the KGB. In tapped phone conversations, Combe told the KGB man he believed "very fervently in Soviet-Australian relations" and wanted to "upscale" relations between the Australian Labor Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Combe was tasked to get monopoly trading privileges in Australian-Soviet trade and was to use some of the proceeds of these profits to "further Soviet-Australian relations." The highly political nature of the relationship with Combe was

indicated by the fact that he dealt with a man he later acknowledged was a KGB officer, and by the fact that Ivanov said his "trade" brief came from none other than Boris Ponomarev, the long-time head of the International Department of the CPSU.

Combe was a key functionary in Australia's governing party. He was well known by all leading Cabinet ministers, departmental heads, top military men, judges, and journalists. He mixed a lot socially with journalists, for a man of his political stature, and was known as a "great leak."

Bailey: Thank you, Mr. Samuel. Are there any questions for our panelists?

Mr. Wallace: Do any of the three of you, as correspondents here for industrial countries, have any access to the Soviet Embassy in Washington? Do you have any contacts there? If you call them up, do you get somebody to talk to?

Journalist B: No.

Mr. Samuel: To get the Vladivostok speech of Gorbachev, I made at least four phone calls to the press office. They did not answer. I finally got a copy of the Gorbachev speech through USIA.

Journalist B: If I have a query, I ask our Moscow correspondent.

Journalist C: I wanted to send one of my staff reporters along with Secretary Shultz for the Shultz-Shevardnadze talks in Moscow. The Soviet embassy said they would issue a tourist visa only. But if you file a story while there on a tourist visa, you may never be allowed into the Soviet Union thereafter. For days we worried. Finally, they gave us press visas, but only after a lot of effort and grief.

Mr. Romerstein: In contrast to the panelist's experience, I did receive the speeches of the Soviet leaders from the Soviet Embassy. But I should tell you that the very nice press officer that put me on the list was later declared persona non grata and asked to leave the United States.

Our Australian colleague has focused our attention on history. One of the difficulties we have is a lack of institutional memory. Many of the things that the Soviets are doing today originated decades ago. In Australia, for example, some 30 years ago, the Soviet intelligence resident defected. He brought out reports written by an Australian communist journalist named Lockwood on other journalists. The reports cited which ones were drunks, womanizers, homosexuals, etc. Lockwood would go and have drinks with journalists and then go

to the Soviet Embassy to type detailed background reports which could be used by the Soviet intelligence service.

Australia is not the only developed country to be a victim of an agent of influence within the ranks of its journalist community. A major Japanese conservative newspaper printed on its front page a Soviet-produced forgery that purported to be the will of Chou Enlai. A recruited Soviet agent on the staff was able to place the forgery on the front page of the paper. So it is not only in the Third World that these things can happen.

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Journalist B: What surprises me at this debate is that we are going through history, talking about what the Soviets or the Communist Party are up to. What they do is common knowledge. Maybe it is not as wellknown in the US. If it isn't, this is because the historical memory is very short in the United States. If you talk to someone in the street in Europe, he will tell you that the Communist Party had been keeping an armed branch for years, and a military, organized structure ready to take power.

Now the Soviet Union tries to get its supporters into power through legal means. Nobody thinks of revolution. The focus now is on denuclearizing Germany. Once West Germany has been denuclearized, then the Soviets and their supporters will try to denuclearize France and Great Britain. This will be accomplished by peacefully putting leftists into decisionmaking positions.

It is important to note that I am not talking about communists coming to power. The Communist Party in Italy realizes it cannot gain office except at the local level. Now it tries to depict itself as member of the Socialist International, not as a communist party. Members are trying to present themselves as having a special relationship with the Social Democrats in Germany, the Socialists in France, and the Labor Party in Great Britain.

The dilemma for the Italians is to decide whether these "socialists" are sincere or not. If the United States does not try to open a dialogue with the Italian Communist Party or get the Christian Democrats and the Socialists to talk with each other, then the US will be unable to respond. Soon the Communists will have gained a lot of ground.

A factor in all of this is the new Soviet emphasis on public relations. In Europe, Mr. Gorbachev is seen in a far better light than is Mr. Reagan.

Mr. Martin: Soviet active measures in the last 20 years have definitely increased in quality. Central to this improvement is the purchase of mass media in Western

countries. About 25 years ago, the East European intelligence services started purchasing small weekly newspapers to use as permanent channels of disinformation and propaganda. The Soviets now do this directly. Ethnos, in Greece, is an example.

Equally important to the increase in the effectiveness of Soviet disinformation and propaganda is the reintroduction into world media of US-generated information that is self-critical. For example, in the first five days after shooting down KAL (Korean Airlines) 007, the Soviets did not say anything. As is inevitable, there were attempts by some Western journalists to look for a reason to blame the US or, at least, to absolve the USSR of guilt. The USSR then began a campaign, using actual speculation from the Western press, in its own defense.

A third reason for the increased sophistication of Soviet disinformation is the emphasis on recruiting journalists as agents of influence. It is true that there have not been too many journalists exposed as agents of influence, especially in comparison with other social categories and professions.

The fourth element responsible for the improvement in Soviet propaganda is the large number of leaks of genuine documents to the press. Even though documents lose informational value after a certain period of time, they can be used to embarrass the government.

Bailey: I have been trying to think of disinformation campaigns which have focused directly on the industrialized countries. The KAL shootdown is a good example. Most of the others we have discussed today have been Third World in orientation and in terms of the milieu in which they circulate.

One campaign, which cannot yet be identified as definitely Soviet and which focuses specifically on Europe, is the so-called zapping story. The story alleges that the United States is zapping antinuclear demonstrators with microwaves at Greenham Common in England. It has appeared mostly in the leftist press. We know for certain that the story did appear, for example, in a Women's International Democratic Front magazine. So, there is a Soviet connection. And the story certainly benefits the Soviets. Although the story is absolutely ludicrous, there are people in sophisticated societies such as the US and England that indeed believe it.

Earlier, Journalist C suggested that disinformation should be printed because it is news if people are talking about it. Readers, who in industrialized countries are relatively sophisticated, should then take on the burden of distinguishing the truth. So my question to Journalist C is: Would you say that it is the journalist's duty to try to probe to find out if that story has any legitimacy, or is it good enough that it has

appeared in a couple of leftist journals and, therefore, you can pick it up?

Journalist C: As in the story about AIDS, we do not present it as serious....

Mr. White: What papers picked up the zapping story?

Bailey: The Guardian.

Mr. White: It wasn't picked up by The Guardian. Nobody here has heard of it, because it wasn't picked up. I have heard of it. I knew about it.

Bailey: It appeared in the March 10, 1986, issue of the Guardian in an article by Gareth Parry.

Journalist C: I think the British paper should first try to investigate and, if the zapping is a fact, should hold the government accountable.

Bailey: Let me make sure I understand your answer. You would say that the reporting of any disinformation, if you call it that, should point out the fact that it could be or is disinformation when it is reported?

Journalist C: No, I would not call it disinformation or active measures. I would say whether it is true, not true, or not sure. In other words, I would treat it as a topic of interest rather than as serious news.

Bailey: Your answer is very similar, indeed, to something that did happen. CBS Evening News reported the AIDS disinformation story without labeling it as disinformation. Dan Rather did not report whether CBS believed the story was true or not, nor did he include the fact that the Department of State had already issued a statement denouncing the story as disinformation. He simply said there was a story that the US Government generated AIDS at Fort Detrick. I think this is the kind of thing you are talking about. But it is important to note that CBS mention of this story--a story that we label as too silly to believe--gained in credibility just because CBS Evening News presented it. There are many examples of the press printing things that ultimately are proven untrue.

Mr. Seeger: The New York Times some years ago was victimized by a letter written supposedly by Solzhenitsyn's first wife, telling what a terrible person he was. If you remember, Solzhenitsyn was not allowed to get a divorce. Novosti got this letter printed in the Times. Later, his first wife got word out that she had not written the letter. But the Times fell for it.

The British press has been used by Victor Louis, in particular. He was accredited as a British journalist in Moscow.

Mr. White: He worked for the Evening News. But it was well known.

Mr. Seeger: But they carried his stories on page one. They were datelined from Moscow, by Victor Louis, without indication that he was a Soviet representative and propagandist.

Mr. White: All the other papers identified him as Victor Louis of the KGB.

Mr. Samuel: He was never identified that way. The most damaging identification made against him was that he wrote from the communist side. No, in fact, that was never even said.

Mr. Seeger: But he still was given official accreditation by a legitimate conservative British newspaper.

Journalist D: When Victor Louis reports to Bild, his journalistic vehicle in West Germany, no one believes what he says. Yet, I am always being asked to follow up what Bild says about this or that.

Mr. Seeger: Bild will never say who the source for a story is. It is owned by Axel Springer, one of the great anticommunists in the world allegedly, yet it does not say its source is Victor Louis. We journalists know who the source is, but the British papers will not say that Victor Louis put that story in Bild, because they are not absolutely sure, and they do not want to make a mistake.

Mr. Kempe: I have talked to Soviet diplomats a lot and I think the Soviet Embassy here is getting better. The Soviet has better regional experts and people who will talk to you and give you real information. In the past, I would never use them to get information; now I do. I check the information out with other sources and I find it valid.

Unidentified Participant: What has been the reaction of Japanese journalists to Stanislav Levchenko's revelations about the effort of the KGB to exploit them?

Journalist C: Mr. Levchenko is the Soviet KGB agent who worked primarily through Japanese media to try to influence public opinion on behalf of the Soviet Government. He defected to the US.

Japanese polls historically show the Japanese dislike the Soviets. The Russians rate so low that I think it is awfully difficult for them to have impact on the general public.

On the other hand, there are some Japanese who really love Russian language, literature, tradition. I think these people could be susceptible to Soviet active measures.

Mr. Paddock: Earlier, someone spoke about the impact of leaked documents. Were you talking about leaks of accurate material that is potentially embarrassing, or the covert acquisition of such papers by the KGB and its subsequent leaking of that information?

Mr. Samuel: In the last five or six years, leaks have been very carefully selected and timed. They have been leaks of damaging, genuine information which was probably acquired originally through espionage.

Much of this material is got under the Freedom of Information Act, but in order to use the act, you have to know what to ask for. Intelligence agents are most likely to know what to ask for and how to release the materials at a very politically effective time.

Mr. Paddock: How would you differentiate between a leak from a hard-digging journalist and that which is leaked deliberately by Soviet intelligence services through their variety of outlets?

Mr. Samuel: Most journalists do not have time for deep digging. We rely on tipoffs. In Australia, two or three journalists who had been getting a succession of highly damaging leaks were recommended by Combe to the KGB. This is all documented by the Royal Commission, so there is nothing new about this. They were recommended to the KGB because they were anti-US. They wanted to prove that the US was involved up to its neck in the overthrow of the Whitlam government.

Mr. Brodie: Why was Combe kept on by the Australian Government?

Mr. Samuel: He wasn't kept on. He was given a job in Vancouver as Australian trade commissioner and consul general.

Mr. Brodie: Well, that's what I mean.

Mr. Samuel: The left screamed that it was being victimized, that better relations with the Soviets were legitimate political objectives, and that he should not be ostracized and have his livelihood taken away. He was a lobbyist at this stage and, of course, his lobbying business was damaged by the revelation of his close relationship with the KGB. After a couple of years, the government gave him this sinecure in Vancouver and that is where he is at the moment.

Mr. Brodie: Those Canadians better watch out!

Mr. Romerstein: Let me follow up on something. When a serious journalist gets a story, regardless of what the source is, he makes an attempt to check it out. This is the most powerful weapon against disinformation and forgeries.

I had a personal experience last year when the Soviets or their bloc produced a forged document which was signed with my name. Two publications called me about it. We were able to expose it as a forgery, and a few months later we got a call from The Guardian in London, saying it had gotten this document. Is it authentic? We were able to refer them back to The Washington Post and US News & World Report stories, exposing it as a forgery. The Guardian editors never published it because they learned it was a forgery, and serious American journalists had determined it to be so.

Maybe part of our problem is that journalists sometimes do not check; they get something in hand and just run with it. When journalists do that, they are not sophisticated and they cannot be taken seriously.

Bailey: When I was visiting Kenya, I spoke to a government official there about the AIDS disinformation story. He told me that if he had only read the AIDS disinformation in the local press, he wouldn't have given it any credence at all. However, because he had read it in a London newspaper, it had to be true!

Journalist D: The worst of the lot!

Bailey: That's what I told him!

Mr. Brodie: We have heard a lot in this session about how sophisticated industrial societies are supposed to be in resisting disinformation. Some years ago there was a story that went around in this country that Procter & Gamble was involved in some kind of Satan worship. There was a symbol that they used which was rumored to be associated with devil worship. That story went from coast to coast in this sophisticated, industrial society and was widely believed. Procter & Gamble was mystified as to how this had got abroad, and they spent a lot of money trying to solve the problem. The conclusion was reached that it was a folk story, spread over the years.

I wonder if the Soviet Union might be taking advantage of this kind of thing, particularly when it comes to talking about Muslim veils having a cross on them, and spare parts for babies being shipped up from Guatemala, and possibly even the AIDS scare. Are they capitalizing on folklore?

Mr. Samuel: One nice example I would like to mention got a big run in New Zealand and a bit of fun in Australia. It was a story about Zionist-US collaboration in the development of a

racially discriminate chemical weapon. Supposedly this weapon would be quite harmless to Israelis, but would kill Arabs. This received serious attention in New Zealand.

A variation on the same story was spread later saying the weapon would only affect blacks, not whites. Somebody must have pointed out that Israelis and Arabs are almost identical racially and in skin color and so the weapon would not work! The story was then attributed to a TASS man who said that he had just been joking.

Mr. Martin: I have a document that I received about a week ago from one of my students. It is the kind of material that circulates in Boston among students--an anonymous letter signed, "sincerely, your friend." This one attacks the Reagan Administration from the ultraconservative point of view.

When I read this material, very carefully, I was sure that it had originated in Eastern Europe. Of course, I do not have the final proof, but as a former practitioner I am fairly certain. It attacks the administration, asks for action, gives no return address.

This is lower class disinformation that probably does not have too much impact. It would affect extremists primarily because such campaigns play upon the existing bias, particularly strong leftist bias or strong rightist conservative bias.

Journalist D: I think we are in danger of overlooking two points. One is the amazing gullibility of all people and societies, industrial or not. You just have to look at what the National Inquirer, which I believe is the most widely read paper in this country, puts out every week. We have a situation where people believe, half-believe, or quarter-believe what the Inquirer says. We fool ourselves if we think we are such sophisticated societies that we can distinguish one story from a fabrication.

Secondly, I think we are in danger of falling to the other exaggeration, which is to believe that everything any Soviet official or someone connected with the Soviet Embassy tells us is misleading or untrue. I have had very useful and very interesting exchanges with people in the Soviet Embassy about arms control and other subjects.

It is very dangerous if we are focusing on disinformation to believe that it is the duty of all Russians to try to disinform all Western journalists. They, as much as any others, sometimes want to know what we think. It is important to avoid being a patsy. If you find that a man is pursuing you week after week and always taking you to the same Hungarian restaurant, then it's fairly clear that he is not interested in an exchange of views.

Bailey: I hope I speak for everyone here in saying that we do not believe that the Soviets are always attempting to disinform us. Today, we are taking a selected set of activities and trying to analyze it, give some examples of it, and understand it better.

I was thinking of an example of disinformation that is not political, or at least not so on the surface. Two months ago, I read a story about how Raisa Gorbachev appears in a videotape making purchases and signing her American Express card. The journalist wrote as if he himself must have seen the video, because he discusses how the tape fades in and out, how it is being widely viewed in Moscow.

Two weeks ago, I saw another article on the same subject in the Washington Post which said a journalist had gone to check the story more fully. He had found absolutely no evidence whatsoever in Moscow of anyone ever having seen such a videotape, and that it must have all been a rumor.

I am a person who thinks about disinformation quite a bit and am aware of how it works. Still, when I read the first article, I believed it.

Journalist D: There is a postscript to that story, and that is they did track down where the film came from, and it is a Western German television piece.[2]

Mr. Samuel: But do we know that it circulated in the Soviet Union?

Mr. White: Yes. The New York Times interpreted it as anti-Gorbachev.

Mr. Raymond: Back to the idea that you can get information from the USSR Embassies--you have to take a look at the character of the Soviet missions abroad. They are very heavily populated with KGB, and they have a clear-cut political influence mission. This mission does not exclude their dissemination of facts. It is precisely the opposite. Good, effective political operations give facts. That is consistent with glasnost. But we have to be conscious of the fact that a major part of Soviet political strategy overseas is influence operations, of which disinformation is one part of a larger process.

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2 The story, as reported by Reuter states: "It was learned today that a West German television film, aired 18 months ago, resembles the alleged underground video in many respects." No evidence that the German film was available in Moscow was reported.

What we are trying to do today is define as clearly as we can the character of the Soviet approach overseas. One speaker commented that active measures do not cause much harm. We need to be very careful about assessing the impact of any given active measure. Any given measure may, taken by itself, have no measurable effect. Yet it may have significant impact over time, especially when viewed in conjunction with a host of other measures.

The Soviet's objective with active measures is to build a climate which will increase the receptivity of their policies. Any single active measure probably would not accomplish this. But it can increase suspicion about Western goals and objectives, or US goals and objectives, or NATO goals and objectives. The resultant mistrust of US policy can then be exploited; the Soviets find more receptivity for their policy.

Participant A: The cumulative effect, produced by the systematic and extensive nature of Soviet active measures, is the dangerous element. Also, it is the planned, prolonged strategic implementation of active measures which distinguishes it from the American or any other country's use of covert action.

Mr. Garrity: The most effective antidote to active measures is the methodical, professional journalist doing the best job he can. And we must keep in mind that the professional journalist operating in the West is working in a totally different environment than the journalist working in the Soviet Union as a foreign correspondent. Foreign correspondents serving in the US have more access here because the society is more open. As a result, much more news gets printed about the West. For instance, the great civil rights problems in the US are a frequently covered topic. Virtually nothing is written about similar problems in the Soviet Union. The Soviets simply claim they have no civil rights problems.

The Soviets are the only correspondents who are restricted in any way in the US, and these restrictions result from reciprocity. It is done by their Foreign Ministry and our State Department. For example, a Soviet journalist may sign up for a press tour but then be unable to participate. The State Department will have checked to see if US journalists have been able to visit a corresponding section of the Soviet Union recently. If not, a Soviet journalist will correspondingly be restricted.

Panel 4: Disinformation and the Campaign on Disarmament

Bailey: Unlike the other three panels which emphasized reporting from places, this panel will focus on a set of active measures regarding a specific Soviet foreign policy goal--international support for Soviet disarmament proposals.

Our first panelist, Journalist D, wishes not to be identified in the published proceedings.

The second panelist is Mr. Richard C. Hottelet who, since 1985, has been the Counselor for Press and Public Affairs at the US Mission to the United Nations.

As everyone in this room probably is aware, Mr. Hottelet reported for CBS many years; he began work there in 1944. He served in bureaus in London, Bonn, Moscow, and the UN and made countless trips to cover stories worldwide.

Our final speaker is the only government representative on a panel today, Mr. Herb Romerstein. He is the current coordinator of USIA programs to counter Soviet active measures. Before joining USIA in 1983, he worked for 18 years on the staff of the House of Representatives. He has authored numerous materials on Soviet active measures, intelligence activities, and international terrorism.

Journalist D: At the time I was serving in West Germany, the big story was the deployment of NATO intermediate nuclear force weapons. And the peace movement was a crucial element of the big story.

Having been in Moscow, I had witnessed the whole Soviet campaign against the NATO dual-track decision getting under way. My remarks today are to some extent an example of how an attempt of Soviet influence was exposed and ultimately defeated, not really just by journalists, but by the effort backfiring.

From the start, it was quite clear that the Russians were going to be very active in trying to prevent the deployment of INF weapons and that they were focusing particularly on Germany. I think Germany has been an absolutely key country in all Soviet measures, simply because of the existence of East Germany, which makes espionage and influence ten times easier than in any other European country. The Russians have invested an enormous amount in trying to influence German opinion, in part because West Germany is a pivotal member of the NATO Alliance.

A hint of the Soviet anti-INF plan came surprisingly openly in one of those endless, turgid TASS pieces reporting a speech

of Boris Ponomarev, an 80-year-old who has been around since Lenin's day or thereabouts. He said that in actively opposing the new dangerous plans of the NATO countries, the Soviet Union should link forces with all men of good will, including socialists and, in particular, men in the church.

It was this last phrase that was so portentous, because it has been through the church that the Russians have attempted to do a lot of their peace campaigning. The Soviets know that the sentiments expressed by world peace forum spokesmen and other such transparent front organizations carry almost no weight in Western Europe. They are also aware that sentiments expounded by respected leaders of the church do carry weight. Therefore, the Russians are very eager to make sure that they are seen in good standing with the church.

Now, I don't want to get into an expose' of Soviet attempts to manipulate the Russian Orthodox Church. These have been well documented. But it is important to note that there is an unofficial bargain struck between the Soviet Government and the Russian Orthodox Church: We will leave you relatively free to do what you want at home, as long as you don't overstep the limit, and as long as you support us abroad.

Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church has been extremely active abroad in proposing new initiatives and putting forth Soviet official viewpoints. During 1982, we got a hint that this would come when there was a huge world forum, called by the Russian Orthodox Church, of "World Religious Leaders United Against the Nuclear Holocaust."

The New York moderator or leader of the Reformed Church in America, who has since become the deputy general secretary of the World Council of Churches, came for this forum, bringing about 15 American clergy with him. They visited my apartment in Moscow the night before the conference started. We talked about what would happen, and there was a great discussion about whether the conference would be just a propaganda show. In particular, the discussion was about a document that everyone would have to sign at the end of the conference. It would condemn Reagan's warmongering and praise Soviet peace initiatives.

Before the conference, the churchmen argued with their Soviet counterparts until 4:00 in the morning on the text of the resolution, insisting that they would not accept anything propagandistic. The Russian Orthodox Foreign Minister, the person in charge of the liaison, had to call a halt to the debate. He reported back to the Soviet Government officials that the document must be discussed further. The final communique, as it was worked out, was more balanced. It welcomed President Reagan's willingness to discuss a zero option, which of course was rather controversial in those days.

The Russian church leaders were pleased. They thought the West could not say this was just a Soviet church propaganda front, because it was a reasonably balanced communique. But many Soviet officials were unhappy. TASS was so cross that it hardly said anything about the whole conference.

On another occasion, I attended a similar sort of conference in Tashkent. This one was for Muslims--Soviet Muslims United Against World Nuclear Weapons, or some such name. The Muslim leaders were not as eager for balance as were the Russian Orthodox leaders. They were quite happily compromised, if they were not themselves the compromisers.

A number of us Western journalists spoke to a very splendid man, Sadiq Mahdi, who was attending the conference. He was the Sudanese opposition leader at the time and is now Prime Minister of Sudan.

Mahdi told us it was the first time he'd ever been to the Soviet Union. He said he was surprised to learn that Qorans are readily available and that Muslims are free to practice Islam.

Anyway, the conference was a controlled affair. The chairman called a halt to the proceedings to adopt a resolution. Mahdi protested that he wanted an addition to the communique, which he said was not complete. He then proposed language calling for the removal of all foreign troops in any Muslim land in which they may be stationed. In addition, he proposed free distribution of Islamic literature and free access to all mosques in any area in which there are Muslim communities.

At this point, the entire proceedings ended, and there was no final communique or resolution agreed upon. However, about two months later, TASS published the original text of the resolution and said it had been adopted.

We wondered how Mahdi and others had been able to introduce such controversial proposals in the controlled environment of the conference. In answer, they said they had passed a note to the conference chairman saying if he did not let them make this final addition, six delegates would immediately get up, walk out, and tell the Western correspondents in the audience why they had left.

The bottom line is that sometimes propaganda and active measures backfire. Similarly, in the peace movement in West Germany, there were several peace conferences at which the movement leaders were themselves aware that they were being manipulated or used as vehicles of influence.

When Yuri Zhukov, an extremely unpleasant, hardline commentator for Pravda, was made chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee in Moscow, it was a signal to everybody that the Committee was a front. From that moment, nobody took a single word that the Peace Committee said seriously.

A big peace conference was held in Berlin in 1984. The Soviet peace group was invited to attend. They replied the would attend only on condition that Soviet deployments of SS-20s were not discussed. The peace movement would not offer such a guarantee, so the Soviets did not attend. This was noted clearly at the outset of the conference.

In conclusion, I would just say that the Russians have obviously had an influence in using the church and this has been a primary vehicle of influence, but it does not always work.

Bailey: Thank you. Mr. Hottelet.

Mr. Hottelet: There is probably no more fertile ground for information, disinformation, misinformation, and manipulation, than the field of disarmament. This is because it encompasses some basic needs and desires for peace and for the transfer of the wasteful funds for arms and weapons to development. It offers all the possibilities.

We have been dealing with disinformation. I'm grateful to our colleague here who underscored the covert nature of it. That is to say, it is usually a program of disseminating falsehood while concealing the origin.

We have dealt with ad hoc and specific campaigns--AIDS, Jonestown, forgeries of various kinds--but underlying the whole thing is a broader effort to gain sympathy. Disinformation works best in certain circumstances, particularly when there is sympathy for the people who are promoting the disinformation.

More than 50 years ago, Willi Muenzenberg, a highly talented German, originated the front organization, which would appeal to a specific set of interests without necessarily having any political homogeneity--fronts for journalists, doctors, youth, women, hikers, children, scientists, lawyers, whatever. To do what? To do two things. One was to suggest to members that their desires and ideals would be most fruitfully pursued in concert with people who understood their needs, who were in a position with discipline and effect to move them forward. And the other, of course, was to plant some ideas which were completely compatible with their own feelings and desires. Thus, they could be used as a conduit for the effectuation of Soviet designs.

When I first became aware of disinformation, I was in Brooklyn College in New York. It was a college for poor kids who would otherwise not really have had a higher education. One episode involved the Young Communist League (YCL), which was a very active organization on a New York City campus. It was about 1935, when relations with the Soviet Union had only recently been established. The demonstration was organized in conjunction with other campus organizations including the YPSL, Young People's Socialist League.

A lot of people turned out to join in the demonstration to defend the Soviet Union, the land of peace and freedom. Some marched; some observed. Many found thrust into their hands various posters and placards having nothing to do with the Soviet Union. They urged opposition to police brutality, referring to some episode not long before involving the New York police, and to Professor So-and-So, a chemistry professor who was not appreciated by the YCL. Placards also called for free textbooks, a matter of considerable concern to those of us who could barely afford to attend school.

The YCL was there just as another democratic and socially conscious organization working in concert with others in a movement which served various purposes, including the purposes of the people who did not know anything about the Soviet Union. The YCL was able to swell the ranks of its demonstration with those who wanted free textbooks or those who may have been involved in the dispute with the New York City police.

Later in the 1930s, in Germany, I came upon another aspect of disinformation--the dissemination of falsehood without identifying the source. Just as Hitler and Goebbels practiced disinformation then, the Soviet Union does today. The Soviets' response to their shootdown of KAL 007 provides but one example.

The USSR could have got out of the KAL disaster very well. The press officer of the Soviet mission at the United Nations called me just after the incident. It was the first time he'd ever come to ask me questions. He asked, "How should we handle this?" I told him to play it straight. The fact is that the USSR shot the airliner down. I told him the Soviet Government should acknowledge its action, say it made a mistake, and thereby gain some measure of public understanding.

The Soviets chose not to admit their mistake. Instead, they wove an intricate disinformation campaign to try to shift the focus and blame to the US. Now, years after the episode of KAL 007, there are still articles speculating about the possibility of the airliner having been used for US intelligence collection. This proves that a big lie certainly sticks.

Some people will believe anything, but for a disinformation campaign to be effective, it can't be totally preposterous. It has got to plug into a felt need; it has got to take advantage of a willingness to believe. Disinformation works best when presented to people who lack information, and presented in an easily understood form. Ideally, it should make sense on the surface and exploit their fears or predilections.

Bailey: Thank you, Mr. Hottelet. Mr. Romerstein.

Mr. Romerstein: Let me first talk about general parameters, and then specifics. Active measures are influence operations; they can be covert, semicovert, or overt. They range from lies, in the form of forgeries or disinformation, to truth. Even the truth can be used by the Soviets for the purpose of active measures.

This creates some dilemmas for us. For example, we have to treat differently a forgery and an authentic document stolen by the KGB which has been leaked to the Western press. In 1979, a US Government document was stolen at the State Department and leaked to the Italian press. At that time, our response to those kind of things was no comment. Today we do comment. We say when a document is a forgery, or we acknowledge if it is authentic.

Today we are focusing on active measures done not by the KGB, but by the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The International Department has the responsibility of coordinating the activities of those communist parties still under Soviet control, such as the American communist party, all of the communist parties of the bloc, and communist parties in West European countries, some of which have at one time shown some independence, but are now drifting back. The ID is also responsible for interaction with a host of international Soviet fronts.

Earlier today, one of the speakers raised the question of what is different under Gorbachev. Indeed, things are different under Gorbachev.

A few years ago Yuri Zhukov, as representative of the Soviet Peace Committee, was approached by West European peace activists. In his interaction with them, he sent a caustic letter saying that they were not fighting for peace when they criticized both Soviet and Western nuclear weapons. He declared they must only criticize Western nuclear weapons.

Zhukov so antagonized the West European peace activists that it was very difficult for the Soviets to make any inroads among them. The Soviets realized this and decided to change tactics. At the Sofia 1986 Conference of the World Peace

Council, the Soviets approached the peace movement differently. Zhukov, formerly the hardliner, was the great softliner at the Sofia meeting. The World Peace Council (WPC) thus began to change its nature.

An Indian communist, who had been head of the WPC, was reduced in power, although he retained the title of president. Real leadership of the WPC is now in the hands of a West European communist from Finland and there has been a Europeanization of the entire WPC apparatus and an outreach to the West European peace activists.

The October 1986 World Peace Council Congress in Copenhagen opened with a promise to attendees that nothing would be suppressed. When the speaker finished, a British delegate got up and said, "I would like to open the discussion about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet human rights violations." An East German woman then stood up and put her hand over his mouth. The moment was caught on camera; the picture showed up on the front page of every Danish newspaper. The Soviets were undoubtedly embarrassed by the stupidity of the apparatchik who stood up and put her hand over a man's mouth to keep him from speaking.

The World Peace Conference in Moscow in February was more carefully controlled. The World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee were running the operation, but they were not visible. Each individual Westerner received a cable signed by an important Soviet inviting him as a personal friend to come to Moscow to attend a conference, all expenses paid, where all viewpoints would be presented. In fact, there was in Moscow a much broader expression of viewpoints than was allowed at the Copenhagen meeting. This more sophisticated approach will certainly be more successful.

Zhukov was removed from the leadership of the Soviet Peace Committee. It probably was not because he was a representative of the old line. In fact, he also represented the new line. He is an apparatchik who represents whatever he is told to represent. But he is such an offensive character to West European activists that it was necessary to get rid of him and put a new figure in who would establish more friendly relationships.

In conclusion, what we are going to see in the future is a much more sophisticated approach. New forms will overtake the existing international Soviet fronts, and new attempts will be made to reach out to West European and American peace activists who are nonresponsive to hardline Soviet operations.

Why are the Soviets doing this? Maybe part of it is glasnost. Maybe part of it is that they are obsessed with the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative. To defeat SDI,

the Soviets know they need to bring in people who otherwise would be antagonistic to them, but who can be mobilized against a strategic defense initiative.

The same sort of flexibility is evident in Soviet treatment of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, a front group. The WFDY had an assembly late last year. Resolutions were passed, but after each was a list of those delegations that opposed the resolution. This is unheard of in communist experience. We must remember that this does not mean that the Soviets are not attempting to influence. It means they realized that the old isolationist attitude was not successful, and that a more ecumenical attitude may be successful.

Bailey: Thank you, Mr. Romerstein. Questions?

Journalist B: I'd like to know what you think, at the State Department, of the new Soviet diplomat?

Bailey: The quality of the Soviet diplomat has been improving, not just those serving in the US, but throughout the world. Soviet ambassadors and public affairs officers are now increasingly trained in the local languages. They are much more outgoing, whereas before they were extremely restricted, and usually characterized as gruff old men.

Soviet diplomats are increasingly younger people who are asked to get out and do handshaking. It is not just a case of smooth Soviet officials from the Washington embassy appearing on US TV. It is a worldwide phenomenon.

Journalist D: Some say the Soviets were behind the Stockholm Appeal (Stockholm Peace Appeal, 1950)--that it was, in essence, a Soviet active measure. This is a very gray area. What about Solidarity on the other hand? It was a mass movement, just as the Stockholm Appeal. The Appeal was made up of people who genuinely did object to nuclear weapons. Maybe they were given logistic support or encouragement from the Soviet Union. Solidarity was given plenty of logistic support from sympathizers in the West. What is the distinction between US support for Solidarity versus Soviet support for the Appeal?

Mr. Hottelet: The agendas provide the distinction. The agenda of the Stockholm Appeal was really to impose, or gain the acceptance of, an uncritical and undiscriminating renunciation of the atom bomb before the Soviet Union was able to develop that weapon. This was an end run, in effect, to gain the atomic disarmament of the United States without any of the essential safeguards or verifications that are required.

In the case of Solidarity, the agenda was really to strengthen the hand of people in Poland who were supporting freedom. The United States and many others supported this

objective. There is no question that Solidarity challenged the Polish Government, and the challenge was highly unwelcome in the Soviet bloc.

Journalist D: Are you suggesting the Stockholm Appeal was instigated and organized by the Soviet Union, or was it just a movement to which the Soviet Union contributed? If it was the latter, then there is no distinction between that and the West's support of Solidarity. I mean if those in Sweden were being very naive in wanting to throw out all nuclear weapons, you could equally argue that many in Solidarity were being naive in wanting to throw off the communist system.

Mr. Hottelet: Looking at the orchestration of the Stockholm Appeal, it is obvious that it would have been impossible without the full support of every propaganda device that the Soviets controlled. There were people in Sweden and elsewhere who may have signed onto it in the best of faith, believing totally that the best thing for mankind would be simply to abolish the bomb. But it could not have occurred without the amplifying effect of the full resources of Soviet propaganda.

Mr. Romerstein: The question is one of control. Solidarity was controlled by its members. Whether Western trade unions provided them with financial support, equipment, or whatever, Solidarity decided what was going to happen.

The Stockholm peace pledge, which was organized by the World Peace Council, was worldwide with one exception: Yugoslavia was being punished by the Soviets for other reasons. The Soviets, who were in complete control of the substance and direction of the Stockholm peace pledge, decided who could and could not participate.

Mr. Paddock: A number of times today participants have raised an issue--that we have perhaps a fundamentally different situation with the Gorbachev regime, the outlines of which are still unclear. Others have maintained that this is just a slight variation of a long historic trend, particularly in the Soviet use of the psychological dimension. Which is it?

Mr. Hottelet: Obviously something very interesting is going on; you cannot dismiss what has happened. I have talked to Russian acquaintances in New York who tried to persuade me of the irreversibility of this fundamental change. They add that Gorbachev must be supported lest his enemies outwit and overthrow him.

So perhaps it is not so irreversible. What has happened so far in the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it is appealing to us, has not gone as far as the Khrushchev changes did. When I pointed this out to my friends, they answered that Khrushchev

had the problem of being impulsive and sweeping; he improvised in a way that made it impossible for him to gain the support of the administration. When I asked for an example, they spoke of Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959. He went to an Iowa farm and when he returned to the USSR, he made people plant corn. He ruined whole sections of Soviet agriculture, because he compelled the planting of corn in areas which were not suitable for corn.

Anyway, I am not totally convinced that the Gorbachev changes are irreversible. We should keep in mind the historical lesson of the New Economic Policy, which was a time of change similar to what is happening now; it also was an opening. However, everything that had happened in those three or four years of the New Economic Policy was reversed at once when Stalin came in. That same phenomenon of reversing all progress could happen to Gorbachev's reforms.

Mr. Curtin: The logistic support for something like a Stockholm Appeal is very important. For example, the Soviets have provided logistic support for demonstrations via their front groups or through local communist parties. They have provided money as well as guidance on who should or should not be at demonstrations. They have provided information on how to get people there and what to do during the demonstration.

Journalist D: There have been media reports about the role of the West German communist party within the peace movement. Much of the discussion has centered on how such a very small number wielded such a disproportionately large influence. In fact, because of that reporting, there has been quite a row within the peace movement. Some of the church-oriented movement leaders have said they do not want to be so manipulated.

Mr. Curtin: It was reported to some degree in the German press, but the overall coverage--particularly in the US--did not really reflect the level of organizational backing by the Soviets. Anyone who has tried to organize a conference like this knows how difficult it is to get 40 people to show up in one place at one time. To get 300,000 to show, instead of doing something else, is very difficult. This is what the Soviets contribute.

Mr. Romerstein: The Soviets are quite concerned about the very thing that you raise--the fact that logistical support and money has to come from the East bloc. It's an embarrassment. So a commission was set up to figure out how to get some money from West Europeans to offset the image that peace movement efforts are being bought and paid for by the Soviets.

The United Nations periodically looks at nongovernmental organizations, one of which is the Christian Peace Conference.

Last month, at a reviewing commission, the US representative said, "The Christian Peace Conference, with its headquarters in Prague, receives money from the Soviet Peace Committee." The very clever representative of the Christain Peace Conference got up and said, "No, you are wrong, we do not receive any money from the Soviet Peace Committee; we get our money from the churches in the socialist countries." Well, it's all from the same pocket, isn't it?

Mr. Hottelet: A front group cannot mount a totally artificial and preposterous operation. The dynamics of a target group--their fears, aspirations--must be used.

At the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament there was a big demonstration in New York. Half a million people came flooding into Manhattan. They were not communists, dupes, or nuts; they were people demonstrating an overriding concern about nuclear danger. They might not have come if the administration at the time had been able to persuade them reasonably that everything prudent was being done to meet their fears.

Until people get enough information, and feel satisfied that their leaders are addressing the problems, there will be continued fear. And it is this fear that the Soviets exploit.

Mr. White: The peace movements are actually a failure in Western Europe. Herr Kohl has been handsomely reelected, Mrs. Thatcher's going to be reelected. President Reagan, in a sense, has joined the World Peace Council to the extent that he has become a nuclear disarmer.

Mr. Romerstein: The Soviet objective is not to get people elected. The purpose is to use leverage to get the Soviet point of view across.

In 1982, when the UN had its second Special Session on Disarmament, there was a mass demonstration of about a half a million people. The US Communist Party, if we had brought it here today, would not have filled this room. There were 28 people on a steering committee that arranged for the demonstration of half a million. At least two represented the US Communist Party and the US Peace Council. In the course of planning the demonstration, it was decided that in interests of harmony only slogans upon which everybody agreed could be used. A single objection could veto use of a particular slogan.

Because everybody agreed that Pershing IIs and Cruise missiles were a threat to world peace, placards were made against them. But, since the question of SS-20s was a controversial one, none were made to protest them.

As the protesters arrived, they were handed signs and they marched for peace, not for SS-20s. The Soviets took movies of the demonstration and subsequently made a film in which they say the American people courageously pointed out that it is their own government that is a threat to world peace and not the Soviet Union.

Mr. White: You have given a graphic description of the failure of that kind of rubbish. I do not think the Russians watching the film believed it. They simply note that half a million people are able to march through New York.

Mr. Romerstein: The film was not shown in Russia. The film was in English; we found it in Grenada. And that, indeed, is where it had an effect--not on the Soviet people.

Mr. White: I didn't think Cruise missiles and Pershings were a big issue in Grenada.

Mr. Romerstein: You're missing the point of the film. It was not to discuss missiles. It was to say that the American people are the enemies of their own government.

Mr. White: People do have an ingrained dislike and distrust of government.

Mr. Romerstein: You have not been here long enough to know. I'm an anarchist myself. This doesn't mean that I do not recognize the responsibilities of government. Every American has a little bit of anarchist in his heart. Nevertheless, we understand that had there not been an American government in the Second World War, we might be speaking German now.

Because we recognize the need for an American government, we are not enemies of it. The image that the Soviets would like to present to the world is that Americans hate their government.

In Grenada, Pershing IIs were not a key issue. The concept that the American people will stop the American government from doing what it wants to do is a very important issue.

Mr. Raymond: I would like to make three brief points. First, I was just reviewing in my mind a list of attempted or actual assassinations of which the United States has been accused: the Pope, Mao, Gandhi, and Palme. This might suggest a conscious campaign to blame such nefarious actions on the US.

Second, on the Solidarity question, it is worth noting that Solidarity has an office in Brussels which is in direct contact with West European trade unions. Its activities are open, the trade union support from the West is open. Nothing is covert.

My last point is on Gorbachev and the question of whether there is lasting change or not. My concern is that there has been little change in foreign policy. The sophistication of presenting foreign policy has increased, but the substance of Soviet foreign policy essentially is the same.

Mr. Hottelet: If the Soviets were to give up the four Japanese northern islands, it would be absolutely historic in its implications. Or, if they were to change their policy on Cambodia, this would send a signal. These are the types of action we must watch for.

Mr. Raymond: The principal issue at this point is Western Europe, where the Soviet policy has been to weaken the NATO Alliance. The themes against NATO include the idea that Europeans must unite, for they all share the same problems. That leaves the US out of that process. A subset of this, then, is that the Europeanization process assumes both Great Powers are morally equivalent. In becoming equidistant from us both, the Alliance is damaged. We might define it as a Finlandization process.

Mr. Seeger: I am troubled by the earlier comment which seemed to suggest that Solidarity was not an indigenous popular movement, that it was somehow instigated by either Western agencies or Western trade unions.

Journalist D: No, I didn't mean to suggest that at all.

Mr. Seeger: It is very important to realize that the debate over glasnost in the Soviet Union is still very strong. Inside the Union of Journalists, they argue about what direction to take. Only a couple of publications have been consistent. Ogonek is a very important publication. It used to be terribly boring, straightforward; now it is a quite exciting magazine.

Moscow News, however, is like a small newsletter. In the past, there were two separate English editions of Moscow News. One was put in airline terminals and at the Intourist offices; another was distributed to the English-speaking residents of Moscow. In one, they printed "Peanuts" cartoons for instance. This edition was for the tourists, to make them think it was a "regular newspaper" in Moscow. The one we got in our apartments didn't have "Peanuts." I wrote a story about it, because we found out they weren't paying copyright duties on "Peanuts." They stopped printing it.

One of the primary elements in the current debate is the thought that, "We've got to make this deal with Gorbachev because we must see him succeed; otherwise, he will be overthrown by reactionaries." People were saying the same thing about Brezhnev in the early 1970s: "If we do not make a

deal with Brezhnev, some real uglies will take over!" The truth is, we have to wait a couple of years to see whether this is a permanent change or not.

If the USSR stops jamming the rest of the radios--not just the BBC in honor of Mrs. Thatcher--that is a sign of change. But if they simply publish Dr. Zhivago, but refuse to publish Solzhenitsyn, then that's not much of a step forward.

Journalist D: Glasnost has only been a policy for a year and a half. It is too much to expect a society that is so slowmoving and conservative to gallop ahead to talk about, for example, reciprocity. Of course, Soviet journalists have much more access, far more information, and many more rights here than foreign journalists based in Moscow. It is unfair to expect reciprocal treatment to come right away. And, we should acknowledge that there has been improvement in the past 18 months.

Mr. Seeger: My point is that over 50 years they have moved forward, and then fallen back to where they were. They were very up during the New Economic Plan period. Ford Motor had a plant in the USSR, as did Singer Sewing Machine. Then, bang! They shut it down!

They invited journalists in during the great starvation because they wanted Western sympathy, and then reversed the policy and threw them out again. Nothing was more dramatic than Khrushchev's stopping censorship, and then he was thrown out of office and they reverted to the pre-Khrushchev period.

This is the history. It is not that they stay forward. It's back and forth, back and forth. The Soviets have made a big step forward, and we have to give them more time to see if it is two steps forward period; or two steps forward, one step back; or two steps forward, three steps back. We don't know yet.

Mr. Brodie: It is not disinformation to ask whether Gorbachev can survive if a particular deal is signed or is not. That is political logic that any government must ask itself.

Mr. Seeger: No, I'm saying they've used the same line with every regime.

Mr. Brodie: You think that the Soviets are using that line? Every Western government is asking itself that same question.

Mr. Seeger: Sure, they're using that line. They say, "You have to reward Gorbachev. You have to reward him because of the bold thing he is doing by signing some agreements."

Journalist D: I have heard people say, "You have to sign an agreement now with President Reagan, because now is the last chance to get an arms agreement with the Republican Party."

Mr. Romerstein: I think that's a Reagan line, too. Are we assuming that because something is a line it is, therefore, untrue? It may very well be that Gorbachev's survival is dependent upon his getting concessions out of the West. The question is, are the Soviets orchestrating that kind of campaign? Yes, they are. One Soviet official after another confidentially tells us that if we do not make a deal with Gorbachev, he will be replaced by mean, uncooperative people.

Mr. Brodie: What is the source of this campaign? Dobrynin?

Mr. Romerstein: Dobrynin has a lot of responsibility for this. He's head of the International Department, which means that he coordinates all of the influence operations. He cannot order the KGB to do things, but he can carry the line from the party to the KGB to indicate what the KGB should be doing.

But he has responsibility for a variety of different pieces of the apparatus, and when those elements of the apparatus get involved in giving us a specific story, we can assume that the story was started at the very highest levels. And that's what they want us to believe. It could be true; it could be false.

Mr. Battye: At one point somebody said the Soviets are pushing; glasnost is irreversible. Now people here are saying that if we don't do a deal with Gorbachev on arms control, maybe it is reversible.

Journalist B: The Soviets are compelled to be more open by their need for technology. The USSR is powerful in sending up rockets, but it is years behind in other technical areas. After discovery, practical development may take eight to 12 years.

Mr. Romerstein: Yes, the lack of technology drives a lot of Soviet decisionmaking. Gorbachev's speech, at the dinner Margaret Thatcher had for him, said that the Soviet Union chose to have economic, scientific, and technological contacts with Britain. But, he laid out the fact that, if the British side remained unwilling to remove the obstacles to high-technology transfers, the money and exchanges would not flow.

Bailey: Our time has run out. I want to thank you all for your participation. We may not have solved the problem of how to make the world a better, more truthful place, but we have clearly defined some aspects of the problem. More importantly, we have discussed a few potential solutions.